F089359_20250821

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Filed 8/21/25 In re J.V. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re J.V. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

P.X. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

F089359

(Super. Ct. Nos. 22CEJ300318-1, 22CEJ300318-2)

OPINION

THE COURT1

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kimberly J. Nystrom-Geist, Judge.

Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant P.X.

Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant B.V.

Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Ashley N. McGuire, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

Appellants P.X. (mother) and B.V. (father) are the parents of twin sisters, J.V. and Jen.V. (collectively, the children), who are the subjects of this dependency case. Mother and father challenge the juvenile court’s orders issued at a Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 366.26 hearing that resulted in mother and father’s parental rights being terminated. Both parents contend the court erred when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Initial Removal

On October 8, 2022, the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) received a referral alleging physical abuse of J.V. Mother brought 10‑month-old J.V. to a children’s hospital emergency room for a fever and cuts on her right hand. Hospital staff discovered multiple fractures throughout J.V.’s body, which included both wrists, right pinky finger, right elbow, right femur, both ankles, and ribs. There were also scratches on her hands and neck. Some of the injuries appeared to be in different stages of healing, and neither parent provided a reasonable explanation for the injuries. An X-ray of Jen.V. revealed old rib cage fractures, but her injuries appeared to be healed. Law enforcement placed a protective hold on both children due to J.V.’s serious injuries.

A social worker from the department contacted mother by phone on October 10, 2022. Mother initially denied having any knowledge of how J.V. sustained her injuries, but she admitted that she picked up the children “roughly” on a few occasions. Mother reported getting frustrated living with father’s family because there were too many people living in the home. Both parents denied there was any domestic violence in the home.

Later that same day, the social worker made in-person contact with father outside of the family’s home. Father informed the social worker that mother was no longer at the home because he asked her to leave. Father’s older sister confronted mother about J.V.’s injuries, and mother admitted that she hurt J.V. Mother told father’s family that she was depressed and grabbed J.V. when she was angry. Father acknowledged that he noticed marks and cuts on the children when he used to come home from work, and he previously quit his job to ensure the children were not hurt again. Mother had four additional children that were residing out of state, and father did not know the reason those children were not in her care.

The children’s paternal grandparents and paternal aunts were present when the social worker entered the home. The social worker spoke to paternal aunt, M.V., in a private area of the home. M.V. witnessed mother handle the children roughly and drop J.V. on the ground in the past. The paternal grandparents advised mother to be more gentle with the children, but mother would not listen to them. M.V. indicated J.V.’s right leg and right arm were red and swollen approximately six months earlier.

On October 11, 2022, the social worker spoke to mother by phone. Mother acknowledged that father kicked her out of the home because she caused the injury to J.V.’s hand. Mother explained that she was frustrated, depressed, and sad because J.V. was “crying too much” and “she bent [J.V.]’s ring finger on the right hand.” The following morning, she noticed J.V.’s finger was broken, and she rushed J.V. to the emergency room. Mother did not take responsibility for J.V.’s other injuries. She claimed J.V. fell off of her bed “a lot” and other children in the home dropped her.

At the team decision making meeting, the department informed both parents that reunification services may not be offered. Mother began crying and reported feeling sad and depressed since giving birth to the children. She admitted to causing J.V.’s rib and leg fractures. Mother also acknowledged that J.V.’s elbow may have broken from the way she picked J.V. up. However, she denied causing all of J.V.’s injuries and Jen.V.’s fractured ribs. Father called mother a “ ‘monster,’ ” and he told mother that she needed help. The department decided that the children would remain in out-of-home care.

The department filed a petition alleging the children were described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (e), and (i). At the detention hearing held on October 12, 2022, both parents were present and appointed counsel. The children were detained from mother and father’s custody, and a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was set for November 30, 2022. Supervised visits with the children were ordered for both parents at twice per week.

Jurisdiction and Disposition

The department’s jurisdiction and disposition report recommended that the juvenile court find the allegations in an amended petition true, deny family reunification services to both parents, and set a section 366.26 hearing. The children were placed in the home of a paternal aunt, and she was willing to provide a permanent plan for the children if reunification with the parents was not successful. Both parents were visiting with the children regularly without any concerns noted. The parents were observed to interact and engage with the children appropriately.

The combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued on several occasions, and a contested hearing was eventually set to begin on September 13, 2023. In advance of the hearing, the department submitted an addendum report with updates on the family’s current circumstances. A physician with the hospital informed the department that J.V. was considered “failure to thrive” and malnourished at the time of her removal. Jen.V.’s old rib fractures were reported by hospital staff as an error, and there were no concerns regarding Jen.V.’s health.

Father completed a parenting program, and he was participating in therapy. Mother was participating in a child abuse intervention program, parenting classes, individual therapy, and anger management classes. Her therapy sessions helped her with coping skills, self-care, and postpartum depression. Supervised visits with the parents were reportedly going well, but J.V. appeared to be more hesitant to go with the parents than Jen.V. Mother and father enjoyed having their visits combined, and the parents read to the children during their supervised visitation.

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing held on September 13, 2023, the department withdrew multiple allegations that father inflicted physical abuse on the children. The juvenile court sustained most of the remaining allegations in the amended petition. The sustained allegations provided findings that mother inflicted severe physical abuse to J.V. and father reasonably knew or should have known of the abuse. Both parents were denied family reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), and a section 366.26 hearing was set for January 11, 2024. Supervised visitation was reduced to a frequency of once per week for both parents.

Section 366.26 Reports

The department’s initial section 366.26 report, dated December 29, 2023, requested a 120-day continuance. The children’s current relative care provider had recently informed the department that she was unable to have the children remain in her home due to her own personal issues. A paternal uncle and aunt came forward as additional placement options, but they were in the early stages of the resource family approval process. The department was developing a transition plan to allow a placement change once the paternal uncle and aunt were approved for placement. The anticipated permanent plan for the children was adoption.

Mother and father attended their weekly supervised visits, and they interacted with each of the children in an age-appropriate way. The social worker observed a visit on October 27, 2023. Both parents were attentive to the children during the visit. The social worker did not observe any emotional breakdowns when the parents had to leave the visit. The children’s current care provider agreed to provide third-party supervision for the parent’s future visits. The care provider reported the parents were on time and had not missed any scheduled visits. The parents fed the children, changed their diapers, and played with them during visits. The juvenile court granted the department’s request for a continuance at the initial section 366.26 hearing.

In advance of the continued hearing, the department submitted an addendum report on April 30, 2024. The report recommended a permanent plan of legal guardianship with dependency for the children. The children were placed with the paternal uncle and aunt on February 7, 2024, and the relatives’ home was certified through resource family approval on April 3, 2024. In order to be eligible for “Kin-Gap” funding, the relative care providers needed to maintain placement of the children with dependency for six consecutive months.3

The department’s assessment described the children as “loveable and active” without any behavioral or medical concerns. The relative care providers indicated the children were always happy, smiling, dancing, and laughing. The department determined the children were generally adoptable, and the relative care providers had demonstrated their ability to provide a loving, stable, and healthy environment.

The relative care providers wanted to provide a permanent plan of guardianship because they did not feel comfortable severing the bond between the children and their parents. The relative care providers were aware that the parents were not in a safe home environment, and they understood that the parents’ circumstances may not change. The children had established a parent-child relationship with the care providers, and the social worker believed it would be detrimental to move the children. The report also noted that it would be in the children’s best interests to sustain their relationship with their parents.

At the continued section 366.26 hearing held on May 8, 2024, the juvenile court noted its concerns that the department’s report did not identify a legal exception to the preferred permanent plan of adoption. The court identified the absence of evidence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, and the relatives appeared to be unwilling to accept financial responsibility for the children. An additional continuance was ordered for the department to provide a report that addressed the legal requirements for ordering guardianship when children are adoptable.

On June 3, 2024, the department submitted a report for the continued section 366.26 hearing. The recommendation was termination of parental rights and ordering a plan of adoption for the children. The children had adjusted well to their paternal uncle and aunt’s home, and their relative care providers were now willing and able to provide a permanent plan of adoption. The social worker observed the children in the relative care provider’s home, and the children appeared happy and comfortable. The children referred to the relative care providers as “ ‘mama and dada.’ ”

The social worker discussed the relative care providers’ motivation for seeking adoption, and the relative care providers explained that they wanted to provide a permanent plan of adoption because they did not want their nieces growing up with a stranger in foster care. The legal responsibilities of adoption were explained to the relative care providers by the social worker. The relative care providers viewed the children as their family, and they preferred adoption over guardianship to ensure the children can remain in their care long term. The social worker also observed that the relative care providers continued to develop a strong, positive parent-child relationship with the children.

The parents consistently attended their weekly visits with the children, and the relative care providers became the third-party supervisors once the children were placed in their home. There were no issues reported during the parents’ supervised visits. The social worker observed a second visit between the parents and children on May 10, 2024. The parents played with the children and read a story. At the end of the visit, the parents sang a song with the children while they cleaned up toys. The children smiled when they saw their relative care providers. The social worker did not observe any emotional distress when the parents left the children.

The department’s assessment determined that it would not be detrimental to terminate the parental rights of mother and father. The report noted that both parents had not progressed beyond supervised visits, and the social worker did not believe there was a significant relationship between the parents and children. The children appeared to enjoy their visits with the parents, but the social worker believed the parents were viewed as friendly visitors by the children as opposed to parental figures. The assessment concluded that the harm of severing the relationship between the children and parents did not outweigh the security, finality, and sense of belonging adoption would provide the children.

On June 11, 2024, the juvenile court granted a request from mother’s counsel to disclose juvenile case records to an expert witness. Mother and father were present for the continued section 366.26 hearing held on June 20, 2024. The court denied the parents’ request to allow their expert to observe visitation absent a stipulation by the children’s counsel and the department. A contested section 366.26 hearing was set at the request of mother and father.

Parents’ Section 388 Petitions

Mother’s counsel filed a section 388 petition requesting the children be returned to her care or family reunification services be provided with increased visitation. Attached to the petition, mother provided a written statement to explain how her circumstances changed since reunification services were denied. Mother attributed her abuse of J.V. to the suffering of a stroke during her pregnancy and resulting postpartum depression. She acknowledged that her stressors and frustration prevented her from caring about herself and those around her. Mother admitted to hitting her child out of frustration to stop her crying.

Mother claimed she did not learn about her postpartum depression until after the children were removed. Since the children’s removal, mother completed a 52-week child abuse class, 12-week anger management class, and two parenting classes. Mother continued to participate in therapy in order to maintain her mental health. Mother’s therapy sessions helped her manage and reduce her depression and anxiety. In her classes, mother learned how to show patience and affection when her children are crying. Mother intended to deal with stressful situations by reaching out to support persons, listening to her children, and providing physical affection to her children.

In support of her section 388 petition, mother also filed a social study report from a forensic social worker that she retained as an expert. Mother’s expert previously worked as a family reunification social worker and court officer for the department. Her education included a Bachelor of Science Degree in Social Work and Master of Science Degree in Forensic Psychology. The expert’s current experience involved conducting psychosocial assessments to learn and connect an individual’s past traumas and experiences to their current behavior.

The parents, paternal uncle, maternal aunt and uncle, and program facilitators were interviewed by the expert. Several case records were reviewed by the expert, including the petition, reports, visitation narratives, and progress notes from the parents’ programs. A detailed history of each parent’s background was provided from childhood to their present circumstances. The expert’s assessment opined that mother and father achieved significant behavioral changes as a result of their completion of programs. The report concluded that both parents had ameliorated the conditions that led to the removal of the children. The expert recommended that the children be transitioned to the parents’ home under a plan of family maintenance.

The juvenile court set mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing to coincide with the contested section 366.26 hearing. Father also filed a section 388 petition requesting the same change in court orders as mother’s petition. Father’s petition was also set for an evidentiary hearing on the date of the contested section 366.26 hearing.

On September 3, 2024, the contested hearing on both parents’ section 388 petitions began. The facilitators for mother’s child abuse, parenting, and anger management classes testified about mother’s satisfactory completion of their programs. Mother’s therapist testified that mother’s goals were to understand her experiences to utilize coping skills. Mother’s progress in therapy allowed her to reduce sessions from weekly to monthly. Her therapist testified that mother had learned to name her emotions and describe her triggers, which was described as “a 180 from not being able to do it at all.”

Mother testified that her parenting classes taught her to offer unconditional love, have healthy communication, and be more assertive. She learned how to identify the physical symptoms of anger from her anger management classes. Mother planned to “take a step away” when she began feeling symptoms of anger, and she would also reach out to her supporters if that did not help her. Mother’s support system included her mother, husband, sister-in-law, church members, former neighbor, and therapist.

The parents’ expert witness testified that she assessed mother and father’s protective abilities using the “strengthening families framework” and “stages of change framework.” The expert opined that returning the children to mother would be in their best interests because of the attachment that began before birth. She believed it would be best for the children to return home because the parents can provide for the children’s safety. The expert testified that mother was in the “maintenance stage” of change where she was continuing her behavioral changes.

After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court denied both parents’ section 388 petitions.4 The contested section 366.26 hearing was reset for November 8, 2024.

Section 366.26 Hearing

After a brief continuance, the contested section 366.26 hearing began on November 18, 2024. The social work supervisor testified that she reviewed each of the social worker’s reports that were prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, and she agreed with the assessments contained in the reports. The supervisor characterized the parents’ relationship with the children as friendly visitors based on their interactions at visits. The children enjoyed their visits, and there were no emotional or behavioral issues either before or after visits. Father provided testimony about his relationship with the children.

The assigned social worker testified that the children show affection for their parents during visits, and the parents brought food to share with the children. The children have referred to the parents and relative care providers as “mommy” and “daddy.” The social worker acknowledged that mother had regularly and consistently visited with the children. The children appeared to be happy while visiting with mother, and mother was able to meet the children’s needs and redirect them when necessary.

The social worker was informed that the children demonstrated sadness at the end of visits, but the care provider could not determine if they were upset about the parents’ departure or the ending of a game. There were concerns that the children spent a majority of their visitation time watching movies or playing games on a cell phone during the past few months. The children would often cry when the parents tried to take the cell phone away from the children.

Mother testified that she was not in agreement with the recommendation for adoption. During her supervised visits, mother and the children played with toys and read books. Mother testified that the children enjoyed her home‑cooked meals. The children responded to mother’s attempts to correct them while fighting over toys. Mother shared hugs and kisses while the children sat in the parents’ laps. Mother testified that the children became sad at the end of visits, and the parents would hold them for a couple of additional minutes before they left. Mother was not in agreement with the department’s recommendation because she continued to be a part of the children’s lives after they had changed placements. Mother believed her continued presence demonstrated that she loved and cared for the children.

Counsel for both parents then argued that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied. After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court continued the hearing for a ruling.

On January 3, 2025, both parents were present and represented by counsel for the ruling on the section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court began with a detailed recitation of the evidence and testimony presented in the matter. The court found the children were likely to be adopted. It acknowledged mother and father had demonstrated the first element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception with regular visitation and contact. However, the court concluded neither parent met their burden of proving the final two elements of the exception with discussion of the elements as set forth in the case of In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 639–640 (Caden C.).

In its ruling, the juvenile court noted the three-year-old children were removed prior to their first birthday, and they had been in out-of-home care for more than two‑thirds of their lives. It acknowledged that visits were positive and the parents were friendly visitors. However, it concluded that such frequent and loving contact did not rise to the level of a substantial, positive emotional attachment.

The juvenile court also found there was no evidence that the children would be harmed by losing the parent-child relationship. In reaching this conclusion the court reasoned as follows:

“There is no evidence of any acting out, any difficulties for the children before or after the visit. There is no evidence that the children suffer insomnia, anxiety, depression. There is no evidence that they would be likely to suffer these things in the future.”

The juvenile court then discussed the benefits of adoption:

“An adoptive home allows the children stability, allows them to be able to grow, knowing that they are part of a family that will not be disrupted. A legal guardianship or any other lesser plan would likely be detrimental to the children. They would never know when they need to go back to court because someone has filed a request to change circumstance. They would never know when their circumstances would be disrupted, when the anxiety of where they would live next would arise as opposed to the benefits of a permanent home through adoption.”

Finally, the juvenile court clarified that its determination was not based on the “horrible injuries inflicted” or a comparison of the parents’ attributes against the potential adoptive parents. The court proceeded to follow the department’s recommendation, and it terminated the parental rights of mother and father and selected a permanent plan of adoption. Both parents filed timely notices of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Both parents contend the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption.

  1. Legal Principles

At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

A parent claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the exception applies. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) Thus, the parent must prove three elements in order to prevail under the beneficial relationship exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)

The first element of the beneficial relationship determination asks the “straightforward” question of whether the parent visited consistently, considering the extent permitted by court orders. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is on the best interest of the child as opposed to punishing or rewarding parents for good behavior in maintaining contact. (Ibid.)

The second element of the exception asks whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629.) The parent-child relationship “may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Id. at p. 632, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court’s focus should again be on the child, and it “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern.” (Caden C., at p. 632.)

When considering the third element, courts must determine “how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Potential negative effects from severance of the relationship might include “emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.” (Ibid.) While an adoptive home might provide a new source of stability that alleviates emotional instability and preoccupation leading to those problems, making the loss of a parent “not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Under this element, the court is again guided by the child’s best interest, but in a “specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Ibid.)

In Caden C., the Court of Appeal held “that because the parent continued to struggle with substance abuse and mental health issues and because of the risks of foster care and benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court could find the child’s relationship with his parent outweighed the benefits of adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 625–626.) Rejecting that conclusion, our Supreme Court found “[t]he Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s struggles related to the specific elements of the statutory exception: the importance of the child’s relationship with the parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.” (Id. at p. 626.) A parent’s struggles with issues that led to dependency were determined to be relevant only to the extent they inform whether the child would “benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance, by losing it[.]” (Id. at p. 638.)

  1. Standard of Review

Appellate courts review a juvenile court’s ruling on the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception using a “hybrid” standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) The substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements of regular visitation and existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) The court’s decision as to the third element—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child—is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) “Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)

The standard of review of a court’s determination that a parent did not meet his or her burden to prove an exception to termination of parental rights is “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (I.W., at p. 1528.)

  1. Analysis

In support of her contention that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the exception, mother cites to evidence that the parents had positive and affectionate interactions with the children during visits. While the parents consistently visited the children, satisfying the first prong of the exception, they failed to identify any evidence that would compel a finding that termination of their parental rights would cause the children great harm. The evidence before the court established that the children appeared to enjoy the supervised visits that occurred with their parents for two years after their removal at 10 months of age. However, evidence that the children had pleasant visits with their parents is not enough to preserve parental rights. (See In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827 [“The parent must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant.”].)

Mother cites to the case of In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, in support of her contention that the juvenile court was compelled to find that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception was applicable.

In In re J.D., the appellate court concluded that it was unclear to what extent the juvenile court—there, acting before Caden C.—considered improper factors at the second step of analyzing the parent-child beneficial relationship exception, and it reversed and remanded for a new section 366.26 hearing in accordance with Caden C. (In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865, 870.) Specifically, it observed that the court had appeared to improperly consider “the mere fact [that mother] had been unable to succeed in overcoming her parenting struggles,” “the suitability of [the minor’s] current placement,” the minor’s attachment to his current caregiver, and the court’s determination that mother did not occupy a “ ‘parental role’ ”—all factors improper under Caden C. (In re J.D., at pp. 864–865.)

We do not find that, in making its determination, the juvenile court abused its discretion by relying on any impermissible factors. Mother suggests that the department and court rendered judgment about the parents’ problems in refusing to apply the exception by “repeatedly” bringing up the events that led to removal. However, the court explicitly stated that it was not considering the severity of the injuries suffered by J.V. or comparing the care of the parents against the prospective adoptive parents in reaching its decision.

Viewed in its context, the juvenile court considered the proper factors of the effect of interactions with the parents and the nature of the parent-child relationship when it referenced the “friendly visitor” relationship that had developed since the children’s removal. On balance, it concluded that continuing the children’s relationship with the parents was not as beneficial as their need for permanence and stability. Furthermore, the court’s ruling on the exception did not consider the parents’ inability to provide a home in comparison to the suitability of the children’s current placement, and there is no indication that the court relied on the parents’ present inability to fill a “parental role” to bar the parent-child relationship exception.

Finally, mother relies on the case of In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530 (Brandon C.), to support her claim the juvenile court erred. In Brandon C., the court placed twin boys in a long-term guardianship with their paternal grandmother, with whom the boys had been living since they were less than one year old. (Id. at pp. 1532–1533.) At the time of the section 366.26 permanency hearing, the mother objected to termination of her parental rights due to her close bond with the children. The mother testified that she had visited them every week for the past three years, except when she was out of state, and that the boys were happy and affectionate with her when she visited. Notably, the paternal grandmother agreed that it was not in the boys’ best interests to terminate their relationship with the mother and father because they had a good relationship that should continue. (Id. at p. 1533.) The court found that it would be in the children’s best interests to maintain the relationship between the minors and the mother, and the department appealed. (Ibid.)

On appeal, the appellate court gave proper deference to the juvenile court’s view of the evidence, noting “[t]he trial court obviously credited the testimony from both mother and grandmother that there was a close bond between mother and the boys, and that a continuation of contact would be beneficial to the children. [The department] did not present any evidence to the contrary.” (Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1537.) Because the department “failed to provide information to the court about the quality of the visits during the years preceding the section 366.26 hearing,” the evidence weighed in favor of the existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at p. 1538.)

Mother’s reliance on Brandon C. is misplaced. In that case, the court upheld a juvenile court’s determination that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children. (Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1533.) Thus, the procedural posture in Brandon C. is the opposite of our present procedural posture. The appellate court in Brandon C. reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision not to terminate parental rights and affirmed that decision. (Id. at p. 1535.) Here, we review the record according the same deference to the juvenile court’s decision and conclude the decision to terminate parental rights was well justified.

In the present case, there were detailed accounts of the frequency, content, and quality of the visits—and such evidence did not convince the juvenile court that the relationship benefitted the children to the degree necessary to deprive them of an adoptive home. The court had to weigh conflicting evidence as to the strength and importance of the children’s relationship with their parents. While the parents testified that it would benefit the children to maintain their relationship, the department presented ample evidence that the children’s bond with their prospective adoptive parents had grown stronger and more significant and that they viewed mother and father as friendly visitors. The court was entitled to credit the department’s evidence.

At such young ages, the children needed permanency and stability, which the relative care providers were willing and able to provide. The limited relationship mother and father were able to maintain through supervised visits in the two years that the children spent in out-of-home care is not that extraordinary case where preservation of parental rights outweighs the preference for adoption. (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1166 [“ ‘ “it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement” ’ ”].) Based on the present record, we cannot find that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.

We have no doubt that the parents love the children or that their visits with the children were positive and enjoyable. However, “A ‘ “showing [that] the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation” ’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818, quoting In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.)

In sum, the evidence in the record weighs in favor of the preferred permanency option of adoption. Given the fact that the children are very young, showed no distress after separating from the parents at recent visits, and were already comfortable with their relative care providers, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Under these circumstances, the court’s ruling is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and remand is unwarranted. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Therefore, the court did not err in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, and its orders terminating mother and father’s parental rights were proper.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.


  1. * Before Levy, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J. ↩︎

  2. All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. ↩︎

  3. “The Kin-GAP program is a state program that provides ongoing funding for children who exit the dependency system to live with relative legal guardians.” (In re Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1211 & fn. 2.) ↩︎

  4. Mother and father appealed the denial of their section 388 petitions. This court affirmed the orders denying the parents’ petitions. (In re J.V. et al. (June 17, 2025, F088656) [nonpub. opn.].) ↩︎