Filed 8/27/25 P. v. Dodd CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed.

James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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During a confrontation caught on surveillance video, defendant Danny Dodd shot at Jerry Mayfield two to three times at close range. Two of the bullets struck Mayfield in the lower back. First responders observed Mayfield lying on the ground, groaning in pain, and that he could not lie on his back in the ambulance. A jury convicted Dodd of attempted voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited from owning a firearm, and found true the allegations that he inflicted great bodily injury on Mayfield and personally used a firearm.

Dodd challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he (1) inflicted great bodily injury and (2) acted with the intent to kill, an element necessary to the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. We conclude Dodd’s arguments lack merit and affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Amended Information

An amended information charged Dodd with premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code,¹ §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). It alleged that in the commission of the attempted murder, Dodd personally used a firearm within the meaning of sections 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.5, subdivision (a), and that he inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of sections 1203.075, subdivision (a) and 12022.7.

The Trial

At trial, the People and defense presented to the jury portions of surveillance videos without audio obtained from a donut shop and laundromat adjacent to the scene of the shooting. The videos show Katherine Holmes walking outside the laundromat and speaking on her cell phone. A few minutes later, Mayfield parked his car in the shopping center parking lot and entered the laundromat where he began to speak with Holmes. Holmes walked away from Mayfield but continued speaking with him for one to two minutes. Mayfield then walked out of the laundromat. After Mayfield got into his car, Holmes approached Mayfield’s passenger-side window and spoke with him for approximately three minutes.

A red sport utility vehicle (SUV), later identified as Dodd’s car, pulled into the parking lot. Holmes twice pointed at Dodd’s SUV while speaking with Mayfield and approached Dodd’s driver-side door. Dodd got out of his SUV. He wore a fanny pack over his shoulder and across his chest. He walked to the passenger side of the SUV while Holmes spoke with and followed him. Mayfield exited his car and approached Dodd. Dodd threw a punch at Mayfield, and Mayfield pushed Dodd. Dodd walked away from Mayfield and removed the bag that was over his shoulder. Holmes and Mayfield followed Dodd, who momentarily stopped to speak with them, and then attempted to avoid them by moving between two parked cars. While moving between the cars, Dodd held the fanny pack in front of him. Holmes and Mayfield blocked Dodd’s attempt to get back into Dodd’s SUV. Dodd took a few steps back, removed an item from the fanny pack before throwing the pack on the ground, stepped rapidly toward Mayfield, and, with an arm rising to parallel with the ground and at a level approximately at Mayfield’s chest, shot Mayfield at no more than an arm’s distance away. After Dodd dropped the fanny pack to the ground and stepped towards Mayfield, Mayfield began to step away from Dodd and turned around as though to flee. Dodd removed the front license plate of his SUV and attempted to remove the rear plate. Then, with a hand at his waistband, Dodd followed Holmes into the laundromat. Holmes ran from Dodd and after a few seconds, Dodd left the laundromat. Dodd then drove away.

Both the People and defense questioned Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) detective Manual Moreno, who obtained the videos, about what appeared on them as the videos were played for the jury. Moreno also testified that law enforcement determined from the license plate number that the SUV was registered to Dodd.

Arran Dahlberg, a City of Los Angeles firefighter paramedic who responded to the scene of the shooting, observed Mayfield on the ground when he arrived. Mayfield’s clothes had been cut away by other paramedics and he had two puncture wounds in his lower back, close to his left hip. Dahlberg transported Mayfield to the closest trauma center, St. Francis Hospital. During the transport, Mayfield was unable to lie on his back because it was too painful.

LAPD officer Marco Ramirez testified that when he arrived at the scene of the shooting, he observed a man “laying face down” and “groaning in pain.” Officers recovered two or three bullet casings at the scene.

Mayfield invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and was unavailable to testify. The People thus read Mayfield’s prior preliminary hearing testimony into the record. Mayfield testified that, in 2020 or 2021, he was transported to the hospital for gunshot wounds. At the time of the preliminary hearing, Mayfield was on supervised release from federal prison. The parties stipulated that Mayfield suffered a prior conviction for distribution of cocaine base.

Dodd did not present any witnesses for trial.

Jury Instructions, Closing Argument, Verdict, and Sentencing

The trial court instructed the jury as to premeditation, attempted murder, the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, and the lesser-related offense of assault with a firearm. It also instructed the jury that “[g]reat bodily injury mean[s] significant or substantial injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.”² It further instructed the jury as to lawful self-defense and that if the jury could draw two or more reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence concerning intent, it had to accept the inference that Dodd did not have the intent to commit the crime.

During closing argument, the People characterized the video as showing Dodd shooting at Mayfield multiple times at close range as Mayfield tried to flee. The People argued this demonstrated an intent to kill. As to great bodily injury, the People reminded the jury of the testimony that “Mayfield lay[] on the ground groaning in agony” and could not be transported in the ambulance on his back.

Dodd’s counsel argued Dodd acted as a reasonable person in shooting Mayfield in self-defense, noting, among other things, that Mayfield and Holmes kept Dodd from retreating into his SUV and that Dodd did not know whether Mayfield had a weapon. Dodd’s counsel further argued that Mayfield turning away from Dodd when the bullets hit him did not mean Mayfield was fleeing when he was shot, and that the bullets hit Mayfield in his lower body suggested Dodd did not intend to kill Mayfield. Dodd’s counsel emphasized that when the evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, the jury must select the interpretation that would support a not guilty verdict. Dodd did not dispute that he was guilty of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited from having a gun.

The jury found Dodd not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and guilty of the crime of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited from owning a firearm. It further found true the allegations that Dodd personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury on Mayfield. The court sentenced Dodd to a total of seven years and six months in state prison.³

DISCUSSION

Dodd argues insufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that he (1) inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, and (2) acted with the intent to kill as necessary to support a finding of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

Standard of Review

“Our task in deciding a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a well-established one. ‘[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . ’ [Citation.] ‘ “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise.” ’ ” (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811-812.) “Where, as here, the jury’s findings rest to some degree upon circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances reasonably justify those findings, ‘but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding’ does not render the evidence insubstantial.” (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 887-888.)

Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Great Bodily Injury Finding

Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) mandates that a person “who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” The statute defines great bodily injury as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” (Id., subd. (f).)

“[D]etermining whether a victim has suffered physical harm amounting to great bodily injury is not a question of law for the court but a factual inquiry to be resolved by the jury. [Citations.] ‘ “A fine line can divide an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the description.” ’ [Citations.] Where to draw that line is for the jury to decide.” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64.) “[T]he injury need not be so grave as to cause the victim ‘ “permanent,” “prolonged,” or “protracted” ’ bodily damage.” (Ibid.) “Proof that a victim’s bodily injury is ‘great’—that is, significant or substantial within the meaning of section 12022.7—is commonly established by evidence of the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the resulting pain, or the medical care required to treat or repair the injury.” (Id. at p. 66.)

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Dodd inflicted great bodily injury upon Mayfield within the meaning of section 12022.7. Mayfield suffered two “puncture wounds” to his lower back from being shot, meaning the bullets did not merely graze him. Ramirez testified that when he arrived at the scene, he observed Mayfield “laying face down” and “groaning in pain,” evidencing that he was overcome with pain. Dahlberg also testified that due to pain, Mayfield could not lie on his back in the ambulance. Further, the paramedics transported Mayfield to a trauma center for treatment. There was no evidence that the penetrating gunshot wounds were—contrary to common understanding—unusually slight or mild. Thus, the jury heard evidence relating to “the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the resulting pain, [and] the medical care required to treat or repair the injury” (People v. Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 66) from which it could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Dodd inflicted great bodily injury upon Mayfield.

Citing several cases, Dodd argues the jury could not find great bodily injury without “specific evidence regarding the extent of the physical injury or some explanation of the medical care the victim received or some description of any negative residual effects the victim suffered as a result of the injury.” (Italics added.) He contends such evidence is necessary for the jury “to reasonably determine whether the thin line separating minor or moderate injuries from the significant or substantial physical injury anticipated in section 12022.7 has been proven.”

All but one of the cases Dodd cites involve non-gunshot injuries. Given the common understanding of the severity of injury usually inflicted when a bullet penetrates a victim’s body, they are of limited value here.⁴ Further, the only gunshot wound case Dodd cites, People v. Beltran, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 1295, did not purport to describe the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a great bodily injury finding. Rather, Beltran held that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury that “ ‘[a] bone fracture [caused by a gunshot] constitutes substantial and significant physical injury within the meaning of . . . section 12022.7’ ” was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it was “inconceivable” the jury would not find great bodily injury based on the evidence. (Id. at pp. 1302, 1308, fn. omitted.) None of Dodd’s cited cases holds that the “line” between significant and minor injuries is always thin or, more importantly, that specific evidence detailing the extent of the injuries or medical care is always required before the jury can find great bodily injury.

Indeed, the People cite other great bodily injury cases involving penetrating gunshot wounds that did not require detailed evidence about the injury or medical treatment in the face of a substantial evidence challenge. For example, in People v. Lopez (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 460, the appellate court upheld two great bodily injury enhancements under section 12022.7 against the defendant where one victim “shot in the right cheek of the hip” “immediately fell to the ground upon being shot, was disoriented, and screamed,” the second victim “felt ‘fire’ when shot in the thigh,” and the record contained no evidence that the victims received medical treatment. (Id. at pp. 462, 463, fn. 5, 465.) In People v. Mendias (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 195, the victim suffered a rifle shot to his upper thigh. Upon being shot, he “ ‘hunched over’—without falling—like he’d been kicked in ‘the private[s].’ The wound ‘burned.’ The victim then raised his arms—in the surrender position—and told [the defendant], ‘You want to kill me, kill me.’ ” (Id. at p. 201.) “The victim was admitted to the hospital, treated for his gunshot wound, and released the next day.” (Ibid.) Although the bullet remained in the victim and sometimes moved, it was not painful when it moved. (Ibid.) Mendias rejected the defendant’s argument that substantial evidence did not support the great bodily injury finding. (Id. at p. 206.)

Dodd thus has not demonstrated that the law requires more specific evidence than that presented at trial for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted great bodily injury upon Mayfield.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Intent to Kill Finding Necessary to Find Dodd Guilty of Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter

“Where a person intends to kill another person and makes an unsuccessful attempt to do so, his intention may be accompanied by any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which can accompany the completed crimes. In other words, the intent to kill may have been formed after premeditation or deliberation, it may have been formed upon a sudden explosion of violence, or it may have been brought about by a heat of passion or an unreasonable but good faith belief in the necessity of self-defense.” (People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824.) The crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter requires the People to prove the intent to kill. (People v. Montes (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1547, 1549 [“ ‘ “an attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense” ’ ”]; CALCRIM No. 604 [attempted voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense].)

“ ‘There is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’ ” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) “ ‘The act of shooting a firearm toward a victim at close range in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the shot been on target is sufficient to support an inference of an intent to kill.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 892 [the jury could reasonably infer the defendant acted with the intent to kill when he “discharged his .38-caliber handgun multiple times from close range in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound”].) An intent to kill does not require premeditation. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162. “[I]f the jury found [the] defendant’s use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance.” (Ibid.)

Dodd argues the jury could have reasonably inferred from the circumstances surrounding the shooting that he did not intend to kill. In particular, he argues the fact that he shot Mayfield at close range but struck Mayfield only in the “non-lethal” location of Mayfield’s lower back belies an intent to kill. He contends that “the first level of this court’s consideration of whether substantial evidence supported a determination that [Dodd] specifically intended to kill Mayfield must be guided by the question of whether the circumstances of [Dodd’s] actions leading up to and during the shooting transaction itself were reasonably susceptible only to a finding that [Dodd] intended to kill Mayfield when he fired the handgun.” In support of this argument, Dodd cites People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164 for the proposition that “ ‘to justify a conviction, the facts or circumstances must not only be entirely consistent with the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.’ ” (Id. at p. 175.)

Dodd quotes Bender out of context and misapprehends our standard of review. In Bender, the Supreme Court considered whether the trial court should have instructed the jury with the above-quoted language. (People v. Bender, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 175.) Upon appellate review, however, we do not consider whether there was some trial evidence that would support a finding that Dodd did not intend to kill and reweigh the evidence. Rather, our inquiry “ ‘ “begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination” ’ ” made by the trier of fact. (People v. Semaan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 79, 88, quoting People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) “ ‘[Our] standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] “ ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296.)

Here, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer an intent to kill. Dodd shot at Mayfield two to three times at close range. (People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 892.) The video depicted Dodd stepping rapidly towards Mayfield as he held the gun and was reasonably susceptible to being interpreted as showing Mayfield fleeing from Dodd in that moment. Yet Dodd continued to move forward and shoot. Moreover, Dodd did not shoot at the ground or at Mayfield’s extremities. Rather, Dodd appeared to shoot as he was leveling the gun so that his arm was parallel to the floor and the gun was aimed at Mayfield’s upper body. Thus, the jury could justifiably infer that Dodd did not merely seek to defend himself or scare Mayfield away and acted with the intent to kill.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.