Case Number: S271483
Court: California Supreme Court
Date Filed: August 31, 2025
Holding
The court held that, under Probate Code § 15402, a settlor may modify a revocable trust by any procedure authorized for revocation—including the statutory method of a signed writing delivered to the trustee—unless the trust instrument expressly makes a particular modification method exclusive or otherwise precludes the use of revocation procedures for modification.
The dispute began when Brianna McKee Haggerty, the niece of settlor Jeane M. Bertsch, challenged a 2018 amendment that removed her as a beneficiary. Bertsch’s original 2015 trust reserved the right “to revoke or amend this Agreement … by an acknowledged instrument in writing.” In 2016 she executed a notarized amendment that named Haggerty as a beneficiary. Two years later she drafted a second amendment, signed but not notarized, that allocated half of her assets to several charitable and individual beneficiaries, omitting Haggerty. The probate court held the 2018 amendment valid; the Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the amendment satisfied the statutory method of revocation set out in Probate Code § 15401(a)(2). Haggerty appealed, asserting that the trust’s “acknowledged instrument” language required notarization and therefore barred reliance on the statutory method.
The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a split among California appellate courts on the meaning of “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” in § 15402. The Court parsed the statutory text, legislative history, and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. It concluded that the phrase qualifies the preceding grant of authority to modify by revocation procedures; thus, the default rule is that any revocation method may be used for modification unless the trust explicitly makes a different method exclusive or otherwise bars the use of revocation procedures. The Court rejected the “any specified modification method controls” approach advanced in King v. Lynch and its progeny, emphasizing that such a reading would render § 15402 surplus legislation and contradict the Legislature’s intent, as reflected in Assembly Bill 2652 and the Law Revision Commission’s commentary.
Legislative history showed that the Commission sought to codify the common‑law principle that the power to revoke includes the power to amend, while preserving the ability of a settlor to limit that power by expressly making a method exclusive. The 1988 amendment to § 15401(c), which extended the prohibition on attorney‑in‑fact revocation to modification, further demonstrates the Legislature’s desire for parity between revocation and amendment procedures.
Applying this construction, the Court found that Bertsch’s trust did not make the notarization requirement exclusive for amendment; it merely described the form of an “acknowledged instrument.” Because the trust did not expressly preclude the statutory method, the 2018 amendment satisfied § 15401(a)(2) and therefore effected a valid modification under § 15402. The Court affirmed the lower courts and remanded for compliance with the affirmed amendment.
The decision clarifies that California courts will interpret “provides otherwise” narrowly, limiting the exception to clear, exclusive language. Practitioners must now scrutinize trust instruments for explicit exclusivity clauses before advising clients that statutory revocation methods are unavailable for amendment. The ruling also signals that policy arguments favoring a stricter amendment regime will not override the statutory text; such changes must come from the Legislature.
Unresolved issues remain, notably how courts will treat trusts that distinguish between revocation and amendment without expressly making either method exclusive. The Court hinted that mere distinction is insufficient to bar statutory revocation methods, but future cases may test the boundary where a trust’s language is ambiguous. Legislators may consider amending § 15402 to address such gray areas, but until then, the presumption favors the availability of the statutory method for modification.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code §§ 15401, 15402 (revocation and modification procedures)
- Restatement (Third) of Trusts, §§ 63‑i, 63‑h (exclusive vs. non‑exclusive amendment methods)
- Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985‑86 Reg. Sess.) – legislative history of §§ 15401‑15402
- Key cases: King v. Lynch, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 (2012); Diaz v. Zuniga, 91 Cal.App.5th 916 (2023); Balistreri v. Balistreri, 75 Cal.App.5th 511 (2022); Pena v. Dey, 39 Cal.App.5th 546 (2019); Conservatorship of Irvine, 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 (1995); Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank, 121 Cal.App.4th 956 (2004); Estate of Lindstrom, 191 Cal.App.3d 375 (1987); Heifetz v. Bank of America, 147 Cal.App.2d 776 (1957).