Guardianship of Saul H.

Case Number: S271265

Court: Cal.

Date Filed: 2022-08-15

Case Brief – Guardianship of Saul H.

Court: California Supreme Court
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: S271265
Disposition: The Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded for issuance of special‑immigrant‑juvenile (SIJ) predicate findings; it held that the probate court must apply the statutory “similar basis” inquiry and may rely on a child’s declaration alone to satisfy the burden of proof.

Holding

The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure § 155 and the Welfare and Institutions Code, a California superior court must find that reunification with a parent is “not viable because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis” when the child demonstrates a substantial risk of serious physical harm resulting from the parent’s failure or inability to protect the child, and that the court must issue the SIJ predicate findings when the evidence— which may consist solely of the child’s declaration—supports those findings. Accordingly, the probate court’s denial of Saul’s petition was reversed and the matter remanded for issuance of the required findings.

Narrative

Lead
In a landmark decision, the California Supreme Court clarified the statutory framework governing special‑immigrant‑juvenile (SIJ) predicate findings, holding that a child’s declaration alone can satisfy the evidentiary requirement and that “poverty alone” is not a bar to finding non‑viability of reunification when the parent’s inability to protect the child creates a substantial risk of serious physical harm.

Procedural History
Saul H., a native of El Salvador, fled gang‑related threats at age 16 and entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor. After a distant relative in California, Jesus Rivas, agreed to serve as his guardian, Saul petitioned the Los Angeles County Superior Court (Probate Division) for the three SIJ predicate findings required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J): (1) dependency or custody, (2) non‑viability of reunification because of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a “similar basis” under state law, and (3) that return to his country of last habitual residence would be contrary to his best interests.

The probate court denied the petition, reasoning that the parents’ inability to provide for Saul stemmed from poverty—not the statutory bases of abuse, neglect, or abandonment—and that, now an adult, Saul could safely return to El Salvador. The court declined to hold a hearing, relying solely on Saul’s declaration. Saul appealed; the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the petitioner had not met his burden of proof and that the lower court’s decision was final and appealable. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve conflicting interpretations of § 155(b)(1)(B) and the appropriate evidentiary standard.

Facts
Saul’s declaration recounts a childhood of forced labor beginning at age 10, repeated gang recruitment attempts, and explicit threats to his life and that of his family. When he was 15, his parents forced him to quit school and work at a car wash, where a gang extorted a “tax.” Fearing for his safety, Saul left El Salvador without his parents’ knowledge, entered the United States, and was placed under the care of Rivas. He now lives in California, attends high school, and receives health care and a stable home. He asserts that his parents lack the capacity to protect him from gang retaliation and that a return to El Salvador would expose him to serious physical harm.

Issues

Burden of Proof: What evidentiary standard governs the petitioner’s burden in establishing the three SIJ predicate findings?
Non‑viability of Reunification: Does “poverty alone” satisfy the statutory requirement of abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a “similar basis” under California law?
Best‑Interest Determination: Must the court consider the child’s age at the time of the petition and the continuing risk of harm when deciding whether return to the home country is contrary to the child’s best interests?
Standard of Review: Should the appellate court apply de novo review of the probate court’s legal conclusions, or defer to its factual findings under a substantial‑evidence standard?

Holding and Reasoning

Burden of Proof – The Court affirmed that, absent a statutory deviation, the default civil burden—preponderance of the evidence—applies (Evid. Code § 115). The legislature’s intent, however, is to make the findings “mandatory” when the evidence supports them (People v. Standish, 38 Cal. 4th 858). Because § 155(b)(1) expressly allows the child’s declaration to constitute the entire evidentiary basis, a declaration made under penalty of perjury is sufficient to meet the preponderance standard. The Court rejected Saul’s “substantial‑evidence” characterization as a misreading of the statutory language.
Non‑viability of Reunification – The Court rejected the probate court’s reliance on the “poverty alone” rule, noting that the rule is rooted in termination‑of‑parental‑rights jurisprudence, not SIJ proceedings. Section 300(b)(1) of the Welfare and Institutions Code permits a finding of dependency when a child faces a substantial risk of serious physical harm because a parent “fails or is unable to adequately supervise or protect” the child. The Court held that parental poverty, when it renders the parent incapable of providing protection against gang violence, satisfies this statutory “similar basis” provision. Moreover, Family Code § 3402’s definition of “abandoned” (lack of provision for reasonable care) does not require proof of parental intent, contrary to the probate court’s reliance on older abandonment case law.
Best‑Interest Determination – The Court emphasized that the best‑interest inquiry under Family Code §§ 3020(a) and 3011(a)(1) is forward‑looking. The fact that Saul is now 18 does not diminish the risk that gangs will target him should he return; the statutory purpose of SIJ is to protect children who would suffer “serious physical harm” if repatriated, regardless of age at the time of the petition. Accordingly, the probate court erred in concluding that the risk dissipated because Saul was no longer a minor.
Standard of Review – The Supreme Court clarified that the probate court’s decision was primarily a legal determination—whether the statutory bases were satisfied—subject to de novo review. The lower court had not conducted an evidentiary hearing or credibility assessment; it merely accepted the declaration and applied an incorrect legal framework. Hence, the appellate court could not rely on a “substantial‑evidence” deferential standard.

Disposition
The Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment, held that the probate court misapplied California law, and remanded for issuance of the three SIJ predicate findings. The remand instructions require the probate court to apply the “similar basis” analysis under Welfare and Institutions Code § 300, to consider the risk of serious physical harm despite the parents’ poverty, and to issue the findings because the declaration alone satisfies the evidentiary threshold.

Impact and Unresolved Questions
This decision solidifies the mandatory nature of SIJ predicate findings when the statutory criteria are met, reinforcing the protective purpose of the federal SIJ scheme. By recognizing poverty‑induced inability to protect as a “similar basis,” the Court expands the pool of immigrant children eligible for SIJ status, aligning California practice with the intent of the Immigration Act of 1990 and subsequent amendments.

The ruling also clarifies that a child’s declaration—when truthful and made under penalty of perjury—carries sufficient weight to satisfy the preponderance burden, limiting courts’ discretion to demand additional corroboration. Practitioners must now ensure that declarations are thorough and that any ancillary evidence (e.g., psychological evaluations) is offered but not presumed mandatory.

Remaining ambiguities include: (1) how lower courts will balance the “similar basis” inquiry against the traditional abuse/neglect/abandonment categories in borderline cases; (2) the extent to which courts may order supplemental fact‑finding (e.g., referrals to child‑welfare agencies) when a declaration is ambiguous; and (3) whether the “best‑interest” analysis must incorporate a detailed assessment of the child’s current age and prospects for self‑support abroad, or whether the statutory focus on physical harm remains exclusive. Future appellate guidance will likely refine these points as more SIJ petitions arise.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Code of Civil Procedure § 155 (SIJ predicate‑finding jurisdiction and mandatory issuance).
Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 (dependency jurisdiction; “substantial risk of serious physical harm” and “similar basis” language).
Family Code §§ 3020(a), 3011(a)(1) (best‑interest of the child).
Family Code § 3402(a) (definition of “abandoned”).
Probate Code § 1510.1(a)(1) (guardian appointment for SIJ petitions).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (federal SIJ eligibility criteria).
8 C.F.R. §§ 204.11, 204.11(b)(5) (regulatory guidance on SIJ petitions).

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