Maleti v. Wickers - Case Brief

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Maleti v. Wickers

Case Number: H048393

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-08-15

Case Brief – Maleti v. Wickers

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: H048393
Disposition: The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the special motion to strike the malicious‑prosecution claim, affirmed the strike of the abuse‑of‑process claim, and reversed the trial court’s denial of attorney fees and costs under CCP § 425.16(c)(1). The matter was remanded for the trial court to award reasonable fees and costs to the attorneys.

Holding

The court held that the plaintiff satisfied the “favorable termination” element of malicious prosecution because the underlying probate action was resolved entirely in the defendants’ favor and at least one claim was disposed of on the merits; consequently, the anti‑SLAPP motion to strike the malicious‑prosecution cause of action was properly denied. The abuse‑of‑process claim, however, was insufficiently pled and was correctly struck. Finally, the court held that a prevailing defendant on a partial anti‑SLAPP motion is entitled to attorney fees and costs, and therefore reversed the trial court’s refusal to award such fees to the attorneys.

Narrative

A probate battle that spiraled into a SLAPP showdown

When Andrew Farkas died in November 2013, his widow, Collette McLaughlin, launched a probate proceeding in Santa Cruz County to confirm an alleged prescriptive easement over a private dirt road that serviced Farkas’s timber‑harvesting parcels. The petition named several neighboring landowners, and, after a series of amendments, eventually added Sal Maleti and his corporation, the Sal Maleti Corporation, as respondents. The Maleti entities had sold the parcel at issue (Parcel 18) to Farkas in 1993 and, by the time of the probate, owned no land in the vicinity.

The probate court disposed of all nine claims asserted against the Maleti respondents. Five were dismissed after the plaintiff failed to amend a demurrer; one was dismissed on a demurrer without leave to amend; and three were struck on summary‑judgment grounds. In February 2019 the court entered a final judgment in favor of the Maleti respondents.

Shortly thereafter, Carol Maleti, the executor of Sal Maleti’s estate, sued McLaughlin and the law firm that had represented her—Law Office of Rodney W. Wickers, and the individual attorneys Rodney W. Wickers and Christina M. Wickers—on two tort theories: malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The complaint alleged that the probate suit was “utterly meritless,” that the defendants knew the claims were time‑barred, and that they pursued the case in bad faith to extract a settlement.

Anti‑SLAPP motion and the trial‑court rulings

The attorneys filed a special motion to strike under California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (the anti‑SLAPP statute). There was no dispute that the claims arose from the attorneys’ exercise of protected petitioning activity, satisfying the first prong of § 425.16(b)(1). The trial court therefore turned to the second prong—whether Carol could show a probability of prevailing on each cause of action.

On September 15 2020 the trial court denied the motion as to the malicious‑prosecution claim, finding that Carol had demonstrated a “minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability.” Conversely, the court granted the motion as to the abuse‑of‑process claim, holding that the complaint failed to plead the requisite elements. The court also denied the attorneys’ request for attorney‑fee awards under § 425.16(c)(1), reasoning that the attorneys derived no “practical benefit” from the partial success.

Both parties appealed: the attorneys appealed the denial of fees, and Carol cross‑appealed the strike of the abuse‑of‑process claim.

The appellate court’s anti‑SLAPP analysis

The Court began by reiterating the two‑step framework of § 425.16: (1) a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action stems from protected activity; and (2) a showing by the plaintiff that the claim is “legally sufficient” and that “a probability of prevailing” exists. The Court emphasized that the second prong requires only a “minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability,” not proof of ultimate success.

Malicious prosecution survives the anti‑SLAPP screen.

The Court first confirmed that the malicious‑prosecution claim unquestionably arose from protected petitioning activity—any claim that a prior civil suit was filed without probable cause is, by definition, a petition to the judicial branch. Having satisfied the first prong, the Court turned to the “favorable termination” element, a prerequisite to malicious‑prosecution liability.

California law requires that the underlying action be terminated “in the plaintiff’s favor on the merits” so that the termination “reflects on the innocence of the defendant.” The Court surveyed the extensive jurisprudence on what constitutes a “favorable termination.” Dismissals based solely on procedural bars (statutes of limitations, lack of standing, or other jurisdictional defects) are not favorable. By contrast, dismissals on substantive grounds—summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or a trial verdict—are favorable because they indicate the defendant’s innocence.

The Court noted that the probate proceeding involved nine distinct causes of action. Six of those claims were disposed of on the merits in the Maleti respondents’ favor—either by sustained demurrers with leave to amend that the plaintiff never pursued, or by summary‑judgment rulings that the claims were time‑barred or otherwise untenable. The remaining three claims (negligence, slander of title, and corporate‑veil piercing) were dismissed on statute‑of‑limitations grounds, a procedural bar. The Court held that the presence of procedural dismissals does not defeat the favorable‑termination analysis so long as at least one claim was resolved on the merits in the defendants’ favor.

Relying on Bertero v. National General Corp. (13 Cal. 3d 43) and Franklin Mint v. Manatt (184 Cal. App. 4th 313), the Court affirmed that a malicious‑prosecution claim may be predicated on a single ground within a multi‑claim suit that was pursued without probable cause. The Court distinguished cases such as Friedberg v. Cox and StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services—where the plaintiff in the underlying action obtained any substantive relief—by emphasizing that in Maleti the probate plaintiff obtained no relief on any claim. Consequently, the Court concluded that the “favorable termination” element was satisfied.

Having met the second prong, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the special motion to strike the malicious‑prosecution claim.

Abuse of process fails the pleading threshold.

The Court then examined the abuse‑of‑process claim. While the underlying conduct also arose from protected activity, the complaint allegedly lacked the requisite factual specificity to show that the defendants used the legal process “in an improper manner to achieve a collateral objective.” The Court found the pleading deficient under Wilson v. Parker (28 Cal. 4th 811) and affirmed the trial court’s strike of the claim.

Attorney‑fee award under the anti‑SLAPP statute

Section 425.16(c)(1) provides that a prevailing defendant on an anti‑SLAPP motion is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. The trial court had denied fees, asserting that the attorneys derived no “practical benefit” from striking the abuse‑of‑process claim. The appellate court rejected that reasoning, noting that the statute does not condition fee awards on the magnitude of the benefit; rather, any partial success on a special motion triggers the fee provision. The Court cited Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (35 Cal. 4th 180) and Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (39 Cal. 4th 260) to underscore that the fee award is a statutory right, not a discretionary grant.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of fees and remanded for a determination of reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Impact and unresolved questions

Maleti v. Wickers clarifies two pivotal points for California practitioners:

  1. Favorable termination in multi‑claim suits – The decision confirms that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that all claims were dismissed on the merits; the existence of a single merit‑based dismissal in the defendant’s favor suffices, provided the plaintiff obtained no substantive relief on any claim. This narrows the scope of Friedberg and StaffPro and aligns the “favorable termination” analysis with the policy behind Bertero—to prevent defendants from escaping liability merely because they raised multiple theories.

  2. Attorney‑fee entitlement on partial anti‑SLAPP victories – The Court reinforces that any partial success on a special motion triggers the fee award, regardless of the perceived “practical benefit.” This bolsters the deterrent function of the anti‑SLAPP statute and signals to trial courts that fee awards are the norm, not the exception.

Nevertheless, the opinion leaves open the precise calculus for “reasonable fees” when the prevailing party’s success is limited to striking a single cause of action. Future litigation will likely flesh out the standards for fee calculations in partial victories, especially where the underlying claim is dismissed for procedural reasons.

Bottom line for practitioners

When defending a malicious‑prosecution or abuse‑of‑process suit that arose from a prior civil action, attorneys should be prepared to demonstrate (a) that the underlying case was terminated on the merits in the defendant’s favor, even if other claims were dismissed on procedural grounds, and (b) that the complaint meets the pleading standards for each tort element. Moreover, any successful anti‑SLAPP motion—partial or complete—should be accompanied by a prompt request for fees, as the statutory right is now unmistakably affirmed.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 – Anti‑SLAPP special motion to strike; §§ 425.16(b)(1)–(2) (protected activity & probability of prevailing), § 425.16(c)(1) (attorney‑fee award).
  • Probate Code § 850 – Petition to establish estate’s claim of ownership and transfer of property.
  • Statute of Limitations § 338 – Limitation period for negligence and slander of title (cited in summary‑judgment analysis).
  • Doctrine of Favorable Termination – Requirement that the underlying action be terminated on the merits in the defendant’s favor (see Lackner v. LaCroix (25 Cal. 3d 747); Casa Herrera v. Beydoun (32 Cal. 4th 336)).
  • Malicious Prosecution Elements – Favorable termination, lack of probable cause, malice, and damages (Bertero v. National General Corp.; Crowley v. Katleman; Franklin Mint v. Manatt).
  • Abuse of Process Elements – Use of process for an improper purpose (Booker v. Rountree; Jarrow Formulas v. LaMarche).
  • Key Cases Cited:
    • Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal. 4th 728 (2003) – Anti‑SLAPP scope.
    • Bertero v. National General Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43 (1974) – Malicious prosecution where only one theory lacks probable cause.
    • Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 (1994) – Distinction between probable cause and favorable termination.
    • Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 184 Cal. App. 4th 313 (2010) – Malicious prosecution may target a subset of claims.
    • Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747 (1979) – Definition of favorable termination.
    • Casa Herrera v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336 (2004) – Elements of malicious prosecution.
    • Lanz v. Goldstone, 243 Cal. App. 4th 441 (2015) – Fee award on partial anti‑SLAPP success.
    • StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Services, Inc., 136 Cal. App. 4th 1392 (2006) – Unfavorable termination when any claim succeeds.
    • Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal. 4th 180 (2005) – Anti‑SLAPP procedural framework.
    • Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260 (2006) – De novo review standard for anti‑SLAPP motions.