Bruno v. Hopkins

Case Number: H044960

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-06-14

Case Brief – Bruno v. Hopkins

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: H044960
Disposition: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, including the award of $829,000 in attorneys’ fees and $96,000 in costs against appellant Lynne Francis Bruno, holding that the trial court properly exercised its authority under Probate Code § 15642(d) to impose personal liability for fees despite the appellant’s limited beneficial interest in the trust.

Holding

The court held that a probate court may order a beneficiary who brings a bad‑faith petition to remove a trustee to pay the full amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, even when that amount exceeds the beneficiary’s present interest in the trust, because Probate Code § 15642(d) expressly authorizes such personal liability.

Narrative

Lead – In a sharply contested dispute over a family trust, the California Court of Appeal upheld a $925,000 fee and cost award against a beneficiary who alleged her mother had forged trust documents. The decision clarifies that California’s probate courts may impose personal liability for attorneys’ fees on a party who files a bad‑faith petition to remove a trustee, regardless of the size of that party’s share in the trust estate.

Procedural backdrop – Lynne Francis Bruno (appellant) sued her mother, the late Mildred Francis (as trustee of the Francis Living Trust), and two sisters, Jane Francis Hopkins and Gwen Francis (respondents), claiming that the trust instruments were forged to limit her inheritance. After a 13‑day trial, the Santa Clara County Superior Court found the trust documents authentic, entered judgment for the respondents, and, invoking its “broad” equitable powers, Probate Code § 15642(d) and Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.420, ordered Bruno to pay $331,274 (Mildred) plus $497,762.50 (Jane and Gwen) in attorneys’ fees and $96,000 in costs. Bruno appealed, arguing (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to assess fees against her personal assets because she held no enforceable interest in the trust, and (2) the fee award was unsupported because she pursued the claim in good faith.

Factual matrix – The Francis Living Trust, created in 1991 by James and Mildred Francis, allocated $200,000 each to the two eldest daughters (Lynne and Gail) and the remainder to the younger sisters (Jane and Gwen). After James’s 2006 death, Mildred became sole trustee. In 2015, nine years after James’s death, Mildder sent the statutory notice required by Probate Code § 16061.7 to the heirs. Bruno, who lived in Pennsylvania, claimed she had previously glimpsed a different estate‑planning document that divided the estate equally among the four children. She alleged that the trust presented to her was a forgery designed to curtail her share. The trial centered on whether the 31‑page trust instrument had been altered. Bruno retained three forensic document examiners (Cunningham, Moore, Flynn) who testified that pages 2‑30 differed in paper, typography, and exhibited “staining” and fiber disturbances suggestive of tampering. The respondents’ expert, Lyter, countered that the differences were consistent with the use of multiple typists and that the paper’s age explained the fiber anomalies. A rebuttal chemist, Aginsky, found no extraneous staining agent. The trial court found the plaintiffs’ experts unconvincing, deemed the trust authentic, and characterized Bruno’s suit as “frivolous” and “a personal attack” motivated by a desire for a larger inheritance.

Legal issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions:

Jurisdictional scope – Whether a probate court may impose a fee award that exceeds a beneficiary’s present interest in the trust, i.e., whether personal liability is permissible under the court’s equitable powers or under statutory authority.
Statutory authority – Whether Probate Code § 15642(d) authorizes such personal liability, and whether the statutory language, legislative history, and related provisions support an interpretation that limits the award to the moving party’s trust interest.

Court’s analysis

Equitable power. The Court reiterated that probate courts are “statutory courts” whose jurisdiction is confined to powers expressly granted by the Probate Code. While courts have “broad equitable powers to protect the trust estate,” those powers do not extend to ordering a party to pay out of personal assets beyond the trust share. The Court cited Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, which held that a trial court may charge fees against a beneficiary’s share but may not impose personal liability that exceeds that share. Accordingly, the appellate court rejected the notion that the trial court’s equitable authority alone justified the fee award.

Statutory construction of § 15642(d). The Court turned to the plain language of the statute, which permits a court “to order that the person or persons seeking the removal of the trustee bear all or any part of the costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees.” The phrase “all or any part” was read as an unequivocal grant of authority to impose the full amount of fees, irrespective of the petitioner’s trust interest. The Court rejected the “enumeration rule” argument advanced by Bruno—that because other Probate Code sections (e.g., §§ 2622.5, 11003, 17211) expressly limit fee awards to a party’s share, § 15642(d) must be read similarly. Legislative history showed that § 15642(d) was added by Assembly Bill 1466 (1995‑96) precisely to prevent a bad‑faith challenger from forcing the trust and its other beneficiaries to shoulder the cost of a frivolous removal petition. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report emphasized that without such a provision, a beneficiary could “hold up a trust” without risking personal assets.

Due‑process and jurisdictional limits. Bruno contended that imposing personal liability violated the jurisdictional limitation in Probate Code § 17003(b), which ties a court’s jurisdiction to a party’s interest in the trust. The Court held that § 15642(d) is a clear statutory exception to that limitation; the legislature intentionally created a carve‑out to protect the trust’s integrity. The Court distinguished Estate of Lee (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 687, where the probate court exceeded its authority because no statute authorized personal liability. Here, § 15642(d) expressly does.

Bad‑faith finding. The appellate court found that the trial court’s determination that Bruno acted “without basis” was supported by substantial evidence. The trial record showed that Bruno’s forgery theory was unsupported, that the expert testimony undermining her claim was credible, and that the trust’s internal inconsistencies could be explained by the use of multiple typists—a fact corroborated by the trustee’s own testimony. The Court noted that Bruno raised no new arguments on appeal and that her attempt to introduce non‑forgery claims in the fee‑award phase was procedurally untimely. Accordingly, the bad‑faith finding satisfied the statutory prerequisite.

Reasonableness of the fee amount. The Court affirmed the trial court’s discretion in calculating “reasonable” fees, noting that the award was consistent with the amount requested by the respondents and with prevailing rates for complex probate litigation involving multiple expert witnesses.

Conclusion and impact – By affirming the fee award, the Court of Appeal solidified the principle that a beneficiary who files a bad‑faith petition to remove a trustee can be held personally liable for the full cost of the litigation, even when that liability exceeds the beneficiary’s current beneficial interest. The decision underscores the weight of § 15642(d) as a deterrent against meritless challenges that threaten trust stability. Practitioners should now advise clients that, when contemplating removal actions, the risk of personal financial exposure is real and not limited to the size of the contested share.

Unresolved questions – The opinion leaves open how courts will handle partial bad‑faith findings where a petition contains both viable and frivolous claims. Moreover, the decision does not address whether a court may apportion fees between the petitioner’s share and personal assets on a case‑by‑case basis, a question that may surface in future disputes involving mixed‑interest beneficiaries.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code §§ 15642(d), 16061.7, 17211(a), 11003(a), 2622.5(a) – Trustee removal, fee awards, and personal liability provisions.
Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420(a) – Fee award for parties who compel proof of genuineness.
Probate Code § 17003(b) – Jurisdiction limited to a party’s interest in the trust (interpreted as subject to § 15642(d) exception).
Equitable powers of probate courts – Inherent authority to protect trust assets (cited cases).

Key Cases Cited

Pizarro v. Reynoso, 10 Cal.App.5th 172 (2017) – Limits on equitable fee awards.
Rudnick v. Rudnick, 179 Cal.App.4th 1328 (2009) – Beneficiary‑borne litigation costs.
Estate of Schloss, 56 Cal.2d 248 (1961) – Statutory nature of probate jurisdiction.
Willis v. City of Carlsbad, 48 Cal.App.5th 1104 (2020) – “Judicial action, not reasoning, is the subject of review.”
Mountain Air Enterprises v. Sundowner Towers, 3 Cal.5th 744 (2017) – Statutory construction principles.
Gund v. County of Trinity, 10 Cal.5th 503 (2020) – Methodology for interpreting statutes.
Estate of Lee, 124 Cal.App.3d 687 (1981) – Limits on probate court’s fee‑award jurisdiction.
Estate of Scott, 197 Cal.App.3d 913 (1987) – Historical limits on personal liability for fees.