Amundson v. Catello

Case Number: D082158

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2025-03-20

Case Brief – Amundson v. Catello

Court: COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: D082158
Disposition: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s interlocutory judgment ordering partition by sale and awarded each party its own costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that the siblings lacked standing to bring a partition action because, at the time the claim was filed, the probate court had not yet determined whether the decedent’s estate owned an undivided interest in the property; consequently, the siblings could not satisfy the “owner of an estate of inheritance” requirement of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 872.210(a)(2).

Narrative

Lead
In a decision that sharpens the boundary between probate administration and real‑property litigation, the California Court of Appeal reversed a lower‑court order compelling the sale of a jointly‑owned San Diego residence, holding that heirs could not sue for partition until the estate’s interest in the land is finally vested. The ruling underscores that standing for a partition claim hinges on a clear, confirmed ownership interest, not a speculative future right.

Procedural History
Leslie J. Knoles (“Decedent”) and Ruth Catello co‑owned a parcel of land, a house, and an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) in San Diego. The 2005 deed created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Shortly before her death in 2020, Knoles recorded a quit‑claim deed converting the joint tenancy into a tenancy‑in‑common, thereby severing the survivorship right. After Knoles died, her four siblings initiated probate (Prob. Code §§ 58, 7000) to settle the estate, while Catello simultaneously filed a quiet‑title action in February 2022 seeking to cancel the 2020 quit‑claim deed and assert sole ownership.

In May 2022 the siblings filed a cross‑claim for partition by sale, alleging that the 2020 quit‑claim deed was valid and that, as heirs, they now owned half of the property. The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment in January 2023 identifying the “record owners” as Catello and the Decedent’s estate, labeling the siblings as “estate successors in interest/beneficiaries,” and ordering a partition sale with proceeds to be divided equally between Catello and the estate. Catello appealed, arguing that the siblings lacked standing because the probate court had not yet resolved the estate’s ownership share.

Facts

2005 deed: joint tenancy (right of survivorship) between Catello and Knoles.
2020 quit‑claim deed (recorded by Knoles): severed joint tenancy, creating a tenancy‑in‑common; each party held a one‑half undivided interest, subject to inheritance rules.
Knoles died weeks after recording the quit‑claim; she left no spouse or children.
Probate opened November 2020; an administrator was appointed in 2021, but the estate’s final distribution remains pending (trial on competing petitions scheduled for August 2025).
Catello’s quiet‑title suit (Feb 2022) sought to invalidate the quit‑claim deed and quiet title in her favor; the estate was not named, nor was the administrator added later.
Siblings’ partition cross‑claim (May 2022) rested on the premise that the quit‑claim deed gave them a vested one‑half interest as heirs of Knoles.

Legal Issues

Whether the siblings satisfied the standing requirement of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 872.210(a)(2) to bring a partition action.
Whether a probate estate—or its heirs—may assert a partition claim before the estate’s interest is finally determined.

Court’s Analysis

Standing as a Threshold Question
The court reiterated that standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, reviewed de novo, and requires a “clear, concrete, and actual” beneficial interest (Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 6 Cal.App.5th 802, 810). The siblings’ claim hinged on their status as “owners of an estate of inheritance” under § 872.210(a)(2).

Effect of Probate Administration
Probate Code § 7000 provides that title to a decedent’s property passes to the devisee or, absent a will, to the heirs, but that right is “subject to administration” and does not become enforceable until the court issues a final distribution order (Estate of Bonanno, 165 Cal.App.4th 7, 17). The appellate court emphasized that until such an order, heirs possess only a contingent interest, insufficient for a partition claim that requires a definite ownership stake. The court cited the 48 Cal.Jur.3d (2025) treatise and Bank of Ukiah v. Rice (1904) 143 Cal. 265, noting that heirs’ rights are “subordinate to the administration of the estate.”

Invalidity of the Siblings’ Theories

Catello’s Naming of the Siblings – The court rejected the argument that Catello’s inclusion of the siblings as defendants in the quiet‑title action implied acknowledgment of their ownership. The purpose of a quiet‑title suit is precisely to extinguish adverse claims; naming a potential adverse party does not confer standing.
Judicial Estoppel – The court found no inconsistent positions by Catello that would trigger estoppel; even assuming an estoppel, the siblings still bore the burden of proving standing.
Conveyance of Expected Interests – The siblings’ late‑filed assertion that heirs may convey or encumber expected interests before final distribution was deemed forfeited (People v. Carrasco, 59 Cal.4th 924, 990) and, more importantly, irrelevant to standing because the underlying interest remained contingent.
Stipulation from the Administrator – The record contained a stipulation in which the administrator “deferred” handling of the partition claim to the siblings and agreed to be bound by any judgment. The court held that such a stipulation does not cure the standing defect; under Civ. Code § 367, actions must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest unless a specific statute provides otherwise. Probate Code § 9823 authorizes the personal representative to bring a partition claim, but no authority permits the representative to delegate that right to heirs.

Conclusion
Because the probate court had not yet adjudicated the estate’s ownership share, the siblings could not demonstrate the requisite “owner of an estate of inheritance” status. Accordingly, the trial court’s interlocutory judgment ordering partition by sale was reversed, and each party was assessed its own appellate costs.

Impact and Unresolved Questions

The decision clarifies that a partition action cannot be used as a tactical shortcut to force the sale of probate assets before the estate’s interest is settled. Probate practitioners must now ensure that any real‑property claims involving estate assets are either brought by the personal representative or postponed until a final distribution order is entered.

The ruling leaves open the question of whether an heir who has already transferred a contingent interest (e.g., via a deed to a third party) could later assert standing to partition the same property once the estate is closed. The court’s reliance on the “clear title” requirement suggests that any such claim would still be barred until the estate’s title is definitively vested, but future cases may test the limits of that principle.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 872.210(a)(2) – Standing requirement for partition actions.
Probate Code §§ 58, 7000, 7001, 9650‑9823 – Administration of estates, title passage, and authority of personal representatives.
Civil Code § 683.2 – Effect of severance of joint tenancy.
Civ. Code § 761 – Definition of “estate of inheritance.”
Civ. Code § 954 – Assignment of causes of action (discussed but not applicable).

Key Cases Cited

Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 6 Cal.App.5th 802 (2016) – Standing principles.
Scott v. Thompson, 184 Cal.App.4th 1506 (2010) – De novo review of standing.
American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller, 59 Cal.App.3d 1008 (1976) – Requirement of clear title for partition.
Estate of Bonanno, 165 Cal.App.4th 7 (2008) – Purpose of estate administration.
Bank of Ukiah v. Rice, 143 Cal. 265 (1904) – Heirs’ rights subject to probate administration.
People v. Carrasco, 59 Cal.4th 924 (2014) – Forfeiture of untimely arguments.
Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.App.4th 171 (1997) – Elements of judicial estoppel.
Owens v. County of Los Angeles, 220 Cal.App.4th 107 (2013) – Discretionary use of estoppel.