Haggerty v. Thornton

Case Number: D078049

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-09-16

Case Brief – Haggerty v. Thornton

Court: COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: D078049
Disposition: Order affirmed; parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

Holding

The court held that the 2018 amendment to the 2015 trust was a valid modification because the trust’s reservation of the settlor’s “right by an acknowledged instrument in writing to revoke or amend” was not an exclusive method; consequently, the statutory revocation procedure under Probate Code §§ 15401 and 15402 applied, and the amendment satisfied that method despite lacking notarization.

Narrative

The appeal pivots on a seemingly technical question—whether a handwritten, non‑notarized amendment to a revocable trust satisfies the trust’s own amendment language and the Probate Code’s statutory scheme. Brianna McKee Haggerty, the plaintiff‑appellant, contended that the 2018 amendment executed by her aunt, Jeane M. Bertsch, was invalid because it failed to meet the “acknowledged instrument” requirement embedded in the trust. The defendants—Nancy F. Thornton and a slate of co‑beneficiaries—maintained that the amendment was effective, arguing that the trust’s amendment clause was not exclusive and that the statutory revocation method could be used to modify the trust.

Procedural backdrop. Bertsch created the trust in 2015, reserving the right to “revoke or amend this Agreement…by an acknowledged instrument in writing.” She subsequently executed three documents: a 2016 amendment (notarized in Illinois), a 2017 handwritten beneficiary list (unsigned), and the disputed 2018 amendment (hand‑signed, delivered to her former attorney Patricia Galligan, but not notarized). After Bertsch’s death in late 2018, Thornton filed to be confirmed as successor trustee, asserting that the 2016 amendment—naming Haggerty as successor trustee—had been revoked and that the later documents reflected Bertsch’s final intent. Haggerty counter‑claimed, seeking a declaration that the 2017 and 2018 documents were invalid for lack of acknowledgment, and that she should be recognized as successor trustee.

The probate court denied Haggerty’s petition, holding the 2018 amendment valid. Haggerty appealed, focusing on the trust’s amendment language and the statutory framework governing revocation and modification.

Statutory framework. The appellate court began by reviewing Probate Code §§ 15401(a) and 15402. Section 15401 authorizes revocation either by a method expressly provided in the trust instrument or by a writing signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee, unless the trust makes the instrument‑specified method exclusive. Section 15402 mirrors this for modification: a revocable trust may be modified “by the procedure for revocation” unless the trust provides otherwise. The court emphasized that “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise” is the operative trigger for exclusivity; absent an explicit exclusivity clause, the statutory method remains available.

Interpretive precedent. The parties leaned heavily on King v. Lynch, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 (2012). In King, the majority held that a trust’s specified amendment procedure was exclusive, barring reliance on the statutory method. The dissent, however, argued that the statutory scheme was intended to preserve flexibility, allowing the revocation method to serve as a default amendment method unless the trust expressly excluded it. The appellate court found the dissent’s reading more persuasive, noting that the California Law Revision Commission’s comments to §§ 15401 and 15402 underscore that the power to revoke inherently includes the power to modify, and that exclusivity must be “explicit.”

The court distinguished King on two grounds. First, Bertsch’s trust did not separate revocation from amendment; it used a single reservation of rights for both. Second, the trust’s language did not expressly make the “acknowledged instrument” method exclusive. Accordingly, the statutory revocation procedure was available for amendment.

Application to the facts. The court concluded that Bertsch satisfied the statutory method by signing the 2018 amendment and delivering it to herself as trustee (via Galligan). The lack of notarization did not defeat the “acknowledged instrument” requirement because the trust did not impose a notarization condition, and the statutory language does not demand notarization for a valid writing. The court also noted that the 2016 amendment, which was notarized, remained valid, but the appeal did not require a definitive ruling on that point.

Thus, the appellate court affirmed the probate court’s order, confirming that the 2018 amendment validly altered the trust and that Haggerty’s claim to be successor trustee was unsupported.

Implications and unresolved issues. This decision reinforces a pragmatic approach to trust amendment disputes: unless a settlor’s instrument expressly mandates an exclusive amendment procedure, the statutory revocation method remains a viable avenue. Practitioners should scrutinize trust language for explicit exclusivity clauses; vague references to “acknowledged instruments” will likely be interpreted in light of the Probate Code’s default rules rather than as a rigid notarization requirement.

The ruling also leaves open the question of how courts will treat “acknowledged” language that is coupled with a clear notarization clause, a scenario not presented here. Moreover, while the court affirmed the validity of the 2018 amendment, it declined to resolve the status of the 2016 amendment, leaving a potential avenue for future litigation if parties dispute which amendment governs the trust’s terms.

Overall, Haggerty v. Thornton clarifies that California’s statutory scheme continues to favor settlor flexibility, and that trust drafters must be explicit if they intend to limit amendment methods to a particular form.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code §§ 15401(a) & 15402 – statutory methods for revocation and modification of revocable trusts.
Civil Code – acknowledgment requirements (referenced but not held controlling).
Doctrine of “reservation of rights” – non‑exclusive reservation does not bind settlor to a single amendment method.

Key Cases Cited