Case Number: B321347
Court: California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two
Date Filed: September 01, 2025
Holding
The court held that, notwithstanding the lack of two witnesses, a California probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding a document’s execution even when the document’s language unambiguously expresses testamentary intent, and that the totality of the evidence in this case satisfied the clear‑and‑convincing‑evidence standard required by Probate Code § 6110(c)(2) to treat Melanie P. Berger’s 2002 letter as a valid will.
Narrative
When Melanie P. Berger died in November 2020, a handwritten letter dated August 16, 2002—addressed “To whom it may concern” and signed by Berger—surfaced in the bottom drawer of her desk. The letter named Maria L. Coronado as Berger’s “sole beneficiary in the event of my death” and listed specific assets, including her Pasadena home, a retirement account, a Mercedes, and a checking account. Berger also suggested that a portion of the retirement assets be set aside for Coronado’s three daughters. No witnesses signed the document, and it was not filed as a formal will.
Coronado, Berger’s former fiancée, filed a petition in February 2021 to have the letter probated. Berger’s sister, the statutory heir, objected. The Los Angeles Superior Court held a two‑day evidentiary hearing, admitted the letter and a series of August 2002 emails between the parties, and ultimately denied the petition. The trial court reasoned that the “context” of the letter was suspect: neither party discussed the document after its creation, Coronado never disclosed it to anyone, and the court questioned Coronado’s credibility as an “accurate reporter of the facts.” After a brief reopening of the hearing, the trial court reaffirmed its denial.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal addressed two intertwined questions: (1) whether a probate court may look beyond the four corners of a document to extrinsic evidence when the document’s language appears unambiguous, and (2) whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, meets the clear‑and‑convincing‑evidence threshold of Probate Code § 6110(c)(2).
Extrinsic Evidence and the Four‑Corners Rule
The appellant argued that the trial court erred by treating the letter’s clear language as conclusive, thereby barring extrinsic evidence. The appellate court rejected that premise, emphasizing that the statutory inquiry under § 6110(c)(2) is not a “meaning” analysis but a “testamentary‑intent” analysis. As the court noted, California law has long permitted extrinsic evidence to prove the circumstances of execution, even when the instrument’s language is unambiguous (see Estate of Torregano (1960) 54 Cal.2d 234; Estate of MacLeod (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1235). Moreover, Probate Code § 6111.5 expressly authorizes extrinsic evidence to determine whether a document “constitutes a will” without limiting that allowance to ambiguous instruments. The appellate court therefore affirmed that the trial court was correctly empowered to consider emails, testimony, and the surrounding facts.
Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent
Having established the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, the court turned to the substantive burden. The letter itself enumerated specific assets, identified a sole beneficiary, and used language—“in the event of my death,” “full discretion”—that is classic of testamentary documents. The surrounding circumstances reinforced this intent: Berger drafted the letter on the day she informed Coronado by email that she was “leaving the house, all the belongings, … to Maria” and that the original would be placed on Coronado’s desk. The timing is material; Berger was days from gender‑reassignment surgery, a circumstance the court treated as an “extreme” situation that heightens the likelihood of testamentary intent (cf. Estate of Kane (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 51). Berger also retained the original in a desk drawer, a location where it was later discovered, indicating an expectation that the document would survive her death.
The appellate court found that, when viewed holistically, the evidence satisfies the “high probability” standard of clear and convincing proof. The trial court’s doubts about Coronado’s credibility and the lack of post‑execution discussion were deemed irrelevant to the intent at the moment of execution. Likewise, the sister’s arguments that a witness was required or that the document’s typewritten form undermined its validity were rejected as attempts to rewrite § 6110.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the Superior Court’s denial, ordered the letter to be admitted to probate as Berger’s will, and awarded costs to Coronado.
Impact and Unresolved Issues
Estate of Berger reinforces the broad discretion courts possess under § 6110(c)(2) to honor non‑formal testamentary documents when clear and convincing evidence of intent exists. Practitioners should note that the presence of unambiguous testamentary language does not preclude the introduction of extrinsic evidence; rather, such evidence is a statutory right and often essential to satisfy the heightened burden.
The decision also signals that courts will look beyond “traditional” indicators of a will—such as witness signatures or a formal probate filing—when the factual matrix demonstrates a contemporaneous, serious contemplation of death. However, the opinion leaves open how courts will treat similar documents where the testator’s mental health or potential undue influence is contested. Future litigants may still need to anticipate challenges to competency and undue influence, even when § 6110(c)(2) is invoked.
Referenced Statutes and Doctrines
- Probate Code § 6110(a), (b), (c)(1) & (c)(2) – Formal requirements for a will and the statutory exception allowing probate of unwitnessed documents upon clear and convincing proof of testamentary intent.
- Probate Code § 6111 – Definition of holographic wills.
- Probate Code § 6111.5 – Admission of extrinsic evidence to determine whether a document constitutes a will.
- Estate of Saueressig, 38 Cal.4th 1045 (2006) – Statutory nature of testamentary power.
- Estate of Stoker, 193 Cal.App.4th 236 (2011) – Application of § 6110(c)(2).
- Estate of Torregano, 54 Cal.2d 234 (1960) – Extrinsic evidence always admissible to prove circumstances of execution.
- Estate of MacLeod, 206 Cal.App.3d 1235 (1988) – Extrinsic evidence may show a document was not intended as a will.
- Estate of Kane, 236 Cal.App.2d 51 (1965) – “Extreme circumstances” increase likelihood of testamentary intent.
- Estate of Sargavak, 35 Cal.2d 93 (1950) – Standard for determining testamentary intent.
- Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc., 11 Cal.5th 158 (2021) – Legal proposition regarding four‑corners rule.
- Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 10 Cal.5th 375 (2020) – Courts may not rewrite statutes.