Robertson v. Saadat

Case Number: B292448

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2020-05-01

Case Brief – Robertson v. Saadat

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑04
Case Number: B292448
Disposition: Judgment of the Superior Court affirmed

Holding

The court held that the plaintiff was not legally entitled to use her deceased husband’s sperm for post‑humous conception; consequently, the plaintiff’s tort causes of action failed as a matter of law, and the trial court’s demurrers to those causes of action were properly sustained.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that underscores California’s strict adherence to donor intent in the realm of assisted reproduction, the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial‑court judgment dismissing a widow’s claims for the loss of her husband’s cryopreserved sperm. Sarah Robertson, who had arranged for the extraction and storage of Aaron Robertson’s sperm while he lay in an irreversible coma, sued the physicians and commercial tissue‑bank operators after the material vanished. The appellate court concluded that, absent a clear, written declaration from the donor authorizing post‑mortem use, Robertson possessed no enforceable right to the gametes and therefore could not recover for the alleged loss of a “fertility interest.”

Procedural History – Robertson filed the original action in the Los Angeles Superior Court on May 26 2016, asserting a laundry list of causes of action—including professional negligence, breach of contract, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of the Business & Professions Code. Defendants moved demurrers; the trial court sustained all demurrers except the breach‑of‑contract claim against the corporate defendants and struck the remaining allegations. After a brief period of leave to amend, Robertson filed a fourth amended complaint that essentially reiterated the earlier claims, again seeking damages for loss of the sperm and the attendant “fertility interest.” The trial court again sustained the demurrers, dismissed the case with prejudice, and entered judgment for the defendants. Robertson appealed; the appellate panel reviewed the demurrers de novo.

Factual Background – Aaron Robertson, a 29‑year‑old man with Marfan syndrome, suffered a catastrophic stroke on May 26 2004 and entered a permanent coma. While he was still alive, Robertson (the plaintiff) told UCLA physicians that she and her husband “always desired to have children together” and asked that his sperm be harvested for future use. UCLA’s risk‑management department, relying on letters Aaron had written to his wife expressing a desire for children, deemed the request a “gift” and permitted the extraction. The sperm was frozen in six vials at Tyler Medical Clinic, where the plaintiff signed a storage agreement.

In 2005 Dr. Peyman Saadat joined Tyler as clinical director; in 2006 Saadat purchased the clinic and transferred the tissue bank to his own entities—Reproductive Fertility Center and In Vitrotech Labs. Robertson continued to pay annual storage fees. In April 2014 she asked the defendants to ship the vials to UCLA for fertility treatment. By November 2014 the clinic manager informed her that only one vial could be accounted for; the remaining five were “missing.” Subsequent inquiries yielded the explanation that the vials were lost in a fire that pre‑dated Saadat’s acquisition of the clinic—a claim the plaintiff found implausible. Further, the defendants allegedly attempted to coerce Robertson into allowing them to perform the insemination themselves, and later claimed the remaining vial belonged to another donor. Robertson asserted, on information and belief, that the defendants had used Aaron’s sperm to impregnate other patients without consent, potentially propagating Marfan syndrome.

Legal Issues – The appeal turned on two intertwined questions:

Whether Robertson, as Aaron’s surviving spouse, possessed a legal right to use his sperm for post‑mortem conception.
Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that Aaron intended his sperm to be used after his death, thereby satisfying the donor‑intent requirement that controls disposition of gametic material under California law.

Court’s Analysis

Donor Intent Governs – The appellate panel anchored its reasoning in the two controlling California cases on post‑mortem gamete disposition: Hecht v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 836 and Estate of Kievernagel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1024. Both decisions hold that sperm and other gametes are “a unique type of property” whose disposition is dictated by the donor’s expressed intent, not by general property or intestacy rules. Kievernagel expressly cited Probate Code § 249.5, which permits a child conceived after a decedent’s death to inherit only if the decedent, in writing, authorizes the use of his genetic material for post‑humous conception. Absent such a writing, the presumption is that the donor did not intend post‑mortem use.

Spousal Status Is Insufficient – Robertson argued that her status as Aaron’s legal next‑of‑kin and the letters he wrote expressing a desire for children should confer entitlement. The court rejected this, emphasizing that the donor’s decision‑making authority over his gametes is distinct from any intestate succession rights. As Kievernagel noted, a spouse who did not provide the gametes “has no ‘interest, in the nature of ownership’ nor any ‘decision‑making authority as to the use of [the gametes] for reproduction.’” Accordingly, the mere fact that Aaron wished to have children with his wife while alive does not, as a matter of law, translate into consent for post‑mortem use.

Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) Does Not Apply – Robertson invoked the UAGA (Health & Safety Code §§ 7150 et seq.) to argue that, as a spouse, she could make an anatomical gift of Aaron’s tissue for “transplantation,” which she stretched to include conception. The court examined the legislative history of the UAGA, which is focused on organ and tissue donation for life‑saving or life‑enhancing purposes, not on reproductive use. The court concluded that “transplantation” under the UAGA does not encompass implantation of gametes to create a child, and therefore the Act provides no authority for Robertson’s claim.

No Sufficient Allegations of Intent – The complaint alleged that Aaron had written letters expressing a desire for children and that Robertson had told physicians of their shared intent. The appellate panel held that these allegations, even if true, do not satisfy the legal standard for donor intent to allow post‑mortem conception. The court stressed that the plaintiff offered no facts showing Aaron contemplated or consented to the use of his sperm after death, nor any written directive meeting the requirements of Probate Code § 249.5. Because the complaint failed to plead a material fact establishing such intent, the tort causes of action could not survive a demurrer.

Public Policy Considerations – While the trial court had framed the issue as “contrary to public policy” to allow post‑mortem use without donor consent, the appellate court sidestepped a broader policy analysis. It noted that the controlling precedent already reflects California’s public policy: the donor’s autonomy over reproductive material persists after death unless expressly waived. The court therefore found no need to revisit the policy question.

Disposition – The appellate panel affirmed the trial court’s rulings sustaining the demurrers to all tort causes of action and striking the complaint, concluding that Robertson was not legally entitled to the sperm and therefore could not claim damages for its loss. The breach‑of‑contract claim against the corporate defendants was left untouched, as the plaintiff had not pursued it further.

Closing Analysis – Robertson v. Saadat reaffirms a line of California jurisprudence that places the donor’s expressed wishes at the apex of post‑mortem gamete disposition. For probate and reproductive‑law practitioners, the decision sends a clear message: a spouse’s desire to conceive with a deceased partner’s sperm is insufficient without a written, donor‑specific directive meeting the statutory criteria of Probate Code § 249.5. The ruling also underscores the limited reach of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in reproductive contexts, narrowing the scope of “transplantation” to traditional organ and tissue uses.

The decision leaves open several practical questions for future litigation. First, the court did not address whether a plaintiff could survive a demurrer by pleading that the donor’s intent could be inferred from a combination of contemporaneous statements, medical‑record notes, and the circumstances of the extraction. While Hecht and Kievernagel suggest that clear, written intent is required, the line between “inference” and “speculation” remains unsettled. Second, the case sidestepped the issue of bailment estoppel; defendants argued that, as bailees, they could not claim the plaintiff lacked an interest in the sperm. The appellate panel declined to resolve that point, leaving lower courts to grapple with the interplay between bailment law and donor‑intent doctrine.

Finally, the court’s refusal to engage with the broader public‑policy debate about post‑mortem reproduction may invite legislative action. Lawmakers could consider amending Probate Code § 249.5 to create a default presumption—either for or against post‑mortem use—when a donor leaves no explicit instructions. Until such reforms occur, the Robertson decision will continue to serve as the primary authority guiding California courts, clinics, and attorneys through the delicate terrain where probate, contract, and reproductive‑technology law intersect.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code § 249.5 – Requirements for a decedent’s written authorization for post‑mortem use of genetic material.
Health & Safety Code §§ 7150.20–7150.30 – Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).
California Commercial Code § 7403 – Unfair business practices (cited in the complaint).
Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, 17500 – Unfair competition and false advertising (cited in the complaint).
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act – Governs donation of organs and tissue.

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