K.R. v. Superior Court - Case Brief

7 Mins read

K.R. v. Superior Court

Case Number: A164821

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-06-22

Case Brief – K.R. v. Superior Court

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-02
Case Number: A164821
Disposition: The petition is granted. A peremptory writ of mandate directs the superior court to vacate its March 7, 2022 order denying K.R.’s demand for a jury trial and to schedule a jury trial on the conservatorship petition.

Holding

The court held that the March 2, 2022 proceeding was a “hearing on the conservatorship petition” under Welfare & Institutions Code § 5350, that K.R. retained a timely five‑day window to demand a jury trial after that hearing, and that the trial court’s failure to personally advise her of the statutory right and to honor her subsequent demand constituted a reversible error—not a waiver or forfeiture.

Narrative

Lead – In a decisive clarification of the Lanterman‑Petris‑Short (LPS) Act’s procedural safeguards, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a conservatee’s right to a jury trial when a trial court mistakenly treats the statutory “hearing” as a bench trial and neglects to advise the party of the right to a jury. The ruling in K.R. v. Superior Court (A164821) underscores that the statutory distinction between a hearing and a trial is substantive, not merely semantic, and that any deviation from the statutory scheme triggers a mandatory right to a jury trial that cannot be waived by participation alone.

Procedural backdrop – The public conservator of Napa County filed a petition on October 7, 2021 to place K.R., a person deemed “gravely disabled” by a mental‑health professional, under a one‑year LPS conservatorship. The petition required a hearing within 30 days (WIC § 5365). After a series of continuances, the trial court held a proceeding on March 2, 2022, heard testimony from a forensic psychologist, the deputy public conservator, and K.R., and then entered an order establishing the conservatorship. Only after the order was pronounced did K.R.’s counsel invoke WIC § 5350(d)(1) and demand a jury trial. The trial court denied the request, citing Baber v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 955, and later affirmed that denial on March 7, 2022.

K.R. appealed via a petition for a writ of mandate, arguing that the denial violated her statutory right to a jury trial, that the court failed to personally advise her of that right, and that she had not waived or forfeited the right by participating in the March 2 proceeding. The public conservator countered that the March 2 proceeding was a bench trial, that K.R. had waived the right by not demanding a trial within five days of earlier continuances, and that any failure to object was a forfeiture.

Statutory construction – The appellate court began by parsing the language of WIC § 5350(d)(1). The statute expressly distinguishes a “hearing” from a “trial” and provides two mutually exclusive pathways:

  1. Pre‑hearing demand – If the proposed conservatee demands a trial before the hearing, the demand “shall constitute a waiver of the hearing” and the matter proceeds directly to trial.
  2. Post‑hearing demand – If no pre‑hearing demand is made, the court must hold a hearing, after which the conservatee may demand a trial within five days.

The court emphasized that the legislature “intended a hearing to be the default proceeding” and that the statute “offers no option to a trial court to conduct a trial in the absence of a trial demand.” Accordingly, the March 2 proceeding, which followed the statutory notice of a hearing scheduled for November 16, 2021 and was the culmination of the series of continuances, is the “hearing on the conservatorship petition” contemplated by § 5350(d)(1).

Timing of the demand – Because K.R. made no pre‑hearing demand, the five‑day window opened after the March 2 hearing. Her counsel’s demand on the same day fell squarely within that period, rendering it timely. The public conservator’s argument that earlier appearances (October 14, 2021; November 30, 2021; etc.) triggered the deadline was rejected. Those appearances were continuances of the pending hearing, not separate hearings, and the statutory notice required a 15‑day minimum before the hearing—requirements that were satisfied only for the November 16 hearing, which was subsequently postponed.

Waiver vs. forfeiture – The appellate panel distinguished waiver—an express, knowing relinquishment of a statutory right—from forfeiture—failure to assert a right at the earliest opportunity. The court declined to apply the forfeiture rationale from Conservatorship of Joseph W. (199 Cal.App.4th 953) because that case involved a different statutory context and because K.R. had a reasonable basis to believe the March 2 proceeding was the statutory hearing, not a trial. Moreover, the court noted that waiver of a jury‑trial right in LPS proceedings must be “knowingly and voluntarily made,” a standard reinforced by recent appellate decisions (Conservatorship of Joanne R., 72 Cal.App.5th 1009; Conservatorship of C.O., 71 Cal.App.5th 894). No evidence showed that K.R. or her counsel knowingly waived the right, nor did the trial court determine that K.R. lacked capacity to make such a waiver.

Procedural safeguard violation – WIC § 5350 incorporates Probate Code § 1828(a)(6), requiring the trial court to personally advise the proposed conservatee of the right to a jury trial. The record shows no such advisement. The court held that this omission is not a harmless error; it “denied the fundamental right to decide who hears the evidence” and therefore mandates reversal. The appellate panel rejected the public conservator’s attempt to invoke harmless‑error analysis from C.O. (71 Cal.App.5th 894), noting that the error was not merely a failure to obtain a waiver but a complete denial of a statutorily guaranteed right.

Disposition – The petition for a writ of mandate was granted. The superior court was ordered to vacate its March 7, 2022 denial and to schedule a jury trial on the conservatorship petition, thereby restoring K.R.’s procedural rights under the LPS Act.

Impact – This decision sharpens the procedural map for LPS conservatorships. Trial courts must:

  • Clearly label the proceeding as a “hearing” or “trial” in accordance with § 5350;
  • Provide the personal advisement required by Probate Code § 1828(a)(6); and
  • Honor a post‑hearing jury‑trial demand made within five days.

Failure to do so will result in mandatory reversal, regardless of the conservatee’s participation in the hearing. The ruling also signals that appellate courts will not extend forfeiture doctrines from ordinary civil actions to LPS proceedings, where statutory rights are expressly protected.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare & Institutions Code §§ 5350–5372 – LPS Act procedural framework for conservatorships.
  • WIC § 5350(d)(1) & (d)(2) – Right to demand a court or jury trial; timing and waiver provisions.
  • WIC § 5365 – Requirement to hold a hearing within 30 days of petition filing.
  • WIC § 5364 – Rehearing provisions (distinguished from trial demand).
  • Probate Code § 1828(a)(6) – Mandatory personal advisement of jury‑trial right.
  • WIC § 5118(d) – Definition of “hearing” for certain LPS sections (not controlling here).
  • Key Cases:
    • Baber v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 955 – No jury trial in § 5364 rehearings.
    • Conservatorship of Joseph W. (199 Cal.App.4th 953) – Discusses waiver/forfeiture in LPS context.
    • Conservatorship of Joanne R. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1009 – Waiver must be knowing and voluntary.
    • Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 – Procedural safeguard of personal advisement.
    • Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378 – Same.
    • People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386 – Distinction between forfeiture and waiver.
    • People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 – Limits on harmless‑error analysis.