Limon v. Circle K Stores - Case Brief

Limon v. Circle K Stores - Case Brief

Limon v. Circle K Stores

Case Number: F082289

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-10-25

Case Brief – Limon v. Circle K Stores

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Date: 2025‑09‑03
Case Number: F082289
Disposition: Judgment of dismissal affirmed; the trial court’s demurrer sustaining Circle K’s motion was affirmed.

Holding

The court held that Ernesto Limon failed to demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury sufficient to confer standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act; consequently, the trial court’s demurrer was properly sustained and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that underscores California’s adherence to a concrete‑injury requirement even for statutory‑damage actions, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of a class‑action complaint alleging Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) violations by Circle K Stores. The ruling clarifies that, absent a demonstrable personal harm, a plaintiff cannot invoke the FCRA’s private‑right‑of‑action provisions in state court.

Procedural backdrop – Ernesto Limon first pursued his claims in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (December 11, 2018). After Circle K obtained summary judgment on the ground that Limon could not satisfy the Article III standing elements, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice (June 9, 2020). Undeterred, Limon re‑filed in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County (June 11, 2020), alleging that Circle K’s employment‑screening consent form violated §§ 1681b and 1681n of the FCRA. Circle K responded with a demurrer on three grounds: lack of capacity, lack of real‑party‑in‑interest status, and lack of standing because Limon alleged no cognizable injury. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal (June 15, 2021). Limon appealed both the demurrer order (appellate case F082289) and the subsequent judgment (appellate case F082929). The appellate court consolidated the two appeals for opinion‑only purposes and ultimately ruled on the merits of the demurrer.

Factual matrix – Limon was employed by Circle K for a month in 2018. As a condition of employment, he signed a consent form that purported to authorize Circle K to obtain a consumer report for “background and experience” verification. Limon contended that the form failed to meet the FCRA’s “stand‑alone, clear‑and‑conspicuous” disclosure requirement of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and that the authorization provision violated § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). He further alleged that the form’s “liability release” and “state disclosures” were extraneous and rendered the consent ineffective. The complaint sought statutory damages of $100‑$1,000 per willful violation, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees under § 1681n.

Legal issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions:

  1. Whether California law requires a plaintiff to allege a concrete injury to maintain a private FCRA claim.
  2. If an injury is required, whether Limon’s allegations satisfy that requirement.

Court’s analysis

Standing doctrine in California vs. federal courts – The court began by contrasting the Article III “case or controversy” limitation that governs federal courts with California’s broader, though not limitless, standing principles. While California courts are not bound by the constitutional injury‑in‑fact test, they still require a plaintiff to have a “beneficial interest” that is concrete and particularized. The court cited Schoshinski v. City of Los Angeles (2017) and the traditional “beneficial‑interest” standard articulated in Associated Builders v. San Francisco Airports (1999) and People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. El Dorado County (2005).

Statutory context – The FCRA’s private right of action, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681j‑1681n, permits individuals to sue for statutory damages even when actual damages are unproven. However, the California appellate court emphasized that the existence of a statutory‑damage provision does not dispense with the standing requirement. The court distinguished Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007), where the California Supreme Court required a plaintiff to show an “invasion of a legally protected interest,” noting that the Unruh Act’s per‑se injurious nature was distinct from the FCRA’s statutory‑damage scheme.

Public‑interest standing – Limon relied heavily on National Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. State of California (1997) and Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017), arguing that the legislature may confer standing in the public interest without a concrete injury. The appellate court acknowledged that California statutes (e.g., CCP § 526a) can create citizen‑suit standing for public‑policy enforcement, but clarified that such statutes expressly grant standing. The FCRA, a federal statute, does not contain a comparable legislative grant of public‑interest standing in California; thus, the public‑interest doctrine was inapplicable.

Application to Limon – The court found that Limon’s complaint did not allege any personal injury beyond the abstract statutory violation. He asserted that the consent form was defective but offered no factual allegation that the alleged defect caused him a concrete harm—such as denial of employment, reputational damage, or reliance on an inaccurate report. The complaint’s “confusion” allegation was insufficient because it was not tied to a specific adverse consequence. Moreover, Limon’s class‑action framing did not cure the deficiency; California law still requires each named plaintiff to demonstrate a personal stake.

Procedural posture – The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s de novo review of the demurrer. Under established precedent (Bower v. AT&T Mobility, 2011), a demurrer is judged on the face of the complaint, assuming all factual allegations are true. Because the complaint failed to state a claim that satisfied the standing prerequisite, the demurrer was properly sustained. The court also rejected Limon’s argument that the trial court’s denial of leave to amend should be reviewed under an abuse‑of‑discretion standard, noting that Limon never raised that issue on appeal.

Disposition – The motion to dismiss the first appeal (F082289) was granted as moot, and the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal entered in Limon’s favor. No leave to amend was granted, and the case was closed.

Impact and unresolved questions – This opinion reinforces that California courts, even when adjudicating federal statutory causes of action, will not dispense with the concrete‑injury requirement absent a clear legislative grant of standing. Practitioners filing FCRA claims must therefore allege specific harms—such as reliance on an inaccurate report, denial of employment, or other tangible consequences—to survive a demurrer. The decision also delineates the boundary between public‑interest statutes that expressly confer standing and federal statutes that do not, limiting the reach of National Paint and Weatherford to contexts where the legislature has spoken.

Unresolved issues remain regarding the precise pleading standards for “confusion” or “lack of clear disclosure” claims under the FCRA. While the court rejected Limon’s bare allegations, it left open whether a more detailed factual record—e.g., testimony that a prospective employer would have declined to hire absent a proper disclosure—could satisfy the injury requirement. Future litigants may need to pair statutory‑violation allegations with concrete, case‑specific consequences to avoid dismissal.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) – 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681‑1681x, §§ 1681b (disclosure & authorization), §§ 1681n (statutory damages), §§ 1681j‑1681k (private right of action).
  • California Code of Civil Procedure – §§ 430.10(b) (demurrer standards), § 367 (real party in interest), §§ 526a (public‑interest citizen suit), § 1086 (mandamus standing).
  • California Civil Code – § 1363 (association standing).
  • Key Cases Cited
    • Ruiz v. Shamrock Foods Co., 804 F. Appx. 657 (9th Cir. 2020) – federal standing analysis.
    • Syed v. M‑I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017) – injury‑in‑fact requirement.
    • National Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. State of California, 58 Cal.App.4th 753 (1997) – public‑interest standing.
    • Weatherford v. City of San Rafael, 2 Cal.5th 1241 (2017) – statutory citizen‑suit standing.
    • White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757 (1975) – taxpayer standing.
    • Associated Builders v. San Francisco Airports, 21 Cal.4th 352 (1999) – beneficial‑interest test.
    • Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 41 Cal.4th 160 (2007) – injury requirement under Unruh Act.
    • Goehring v. Chapman Univ., 121 Cal.App.4th 353 (2004) – statutory penalties vs. damages.
    • Schoshinski v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.App.5th 780 (2017) – standing for damages actions.
    • Bower v. AT&T Mobility, 196 Cal.App.4th 1545 (2011) – de novo review of demurrers.
    • Sisemore v. Master Financial, 151 Cal.App.4th 1386 (2007) – standards for demurrer analysis.

The decision thus serves as a cautionary benchmark for California practitioners: statutory‑damage actions, even under federal consumer‑protection statutes, must be anchored in a plaintiff’s concrete, personal injury to survive a demurrer.

Last updated September 05, 2025.