Ring v. Harmon - Case Brief

Ring v. Harmon

Case Number: E075232

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-12-15

Case Brief – Ring v. Harmon

Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: E075232
Disposition: The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and the case remanded with directions to vacate the order sustaining the demurrer, to overrule the demurrer as to the financial‑elder‑abuse claim, and to proceed consistent with this opinion; appellant’s costs on appeal are awarded.

Holding

The court held that an elder who is simultaneously a beneficiary and the personal representative of a probate estate may bring a financial‑elder‑abuse action in her individual capacity when the alleged abuse deprives her of a property right—whether the property is held directly or through the estate—while the estate‑related causes of action must be pursued in the representative capacity.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that clarifies the interface between probate administration and California’s elder‑abuse statutes, the Fourth Appellate District reversed a trial‑court dismissal of a financial‑elder‑abuse claim filed by an 80‑year‑old personal representative who alleged that a predatory loan, arranged through the probate process, stripped her of the value of a house bequeathed by her deceased daughter.

Procedural backdrop – Awana Ring, the sole heir of her daughter Vickie Atiyeh, was appointed personal representative of Atiyeh’s estate in 2016. Ring sued Richard M. Harmon, TSG Financial Corp., and associated parties, asserting nine causes of action—including predatory lending, breach of fiduciary duty, and a financial‑elder‑abuse claim—solely in her individual capacity. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer, holding that all claims must be brought in Ring’s capacity as personal representative. After Ring’s motion for reconsideration and an ex‑parte application to file a third amended complaint were denied, she appealed. The appellate court reviewed the demurrer under the standard that, when a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend but the plaintiff elects not to amend, the complaint is presumed to state the strongest possible case.

Factual matrix – Upon Atiyeh’s death, the will left a single‑family home, valued at roughly $400,000, to Ring. Scott Robb, Ring’s son, allegedly conspired with Harmon and TSG to initiate probate, secure Ring’s appointment, and induce her to borrow $200,000 from the respondents on terms that were “predatory”: a 10.99 % interest‑only period, a balloon payment of $201,831.67, and assorted fees totaling $18,000. The loan proceeds were used to pay off existing liens, cover fees, and—crucially—were funneled into an estate account that the Robbs subsequently withdrew for personal use. Ring contends that the transaction not only burdened the estate with excessive debt but also diminished the value of her individual interest in the house, effectively depriving her of a property right.

Legal issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions:

Whether Ring, as both beneficiary and personal representative, possessed standing to sue in her individual capacity on the financial‑elder‑abuse claim.
Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that Ring was “deprived of any property right” within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code § 15610.30(c).

Court’s analysis – standing – The court reiterated that a personal representative is the exclusive party authorized to sue on behalf of a probate estate (Probate Code § 9820; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 369). Beneficiaries may sue the estate only in limited contexts—quiet‑title actions (Prob. Code § 9654) or where “special circumstances” render the representative unable or unwilling to act (Bohn v. Smith (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 678). The court found no such special circumstance for Ring’s non‑elder‑abuse claims; those should be pursued, if at all, in her representative capacity. However, the elder‑abuse claim is distinct because the statute expressly permits an elder—or a person acting with the elder’s consent—to bring an action on the elder’s own behalf (Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198). Since the alleged abuse targeted Ring personally, the court concluded that she may sue in her individual capacity despite also serving as personal representative.

Court’s analysis – pleading sufficiency – The appellate panel parsed the statutory language of § 15610.30(c), emphasizing that “any property right” includes interests that are inchoate or subject to administration. Citing Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134, the court described property as a “bundle of sticks” encompassing title, possessory, and use rights. Ring’s vested title to the house, albeit subject to probate administration, gave her a recognizable property interest. The loan’s $200,000 encumbrance reduced the value of that interest, satisfying the “deprivation” element. The respondents’ receipt of fees and the diversion of loan proceeds satisfied the “wrongful use” prong. The court rejected the defendants’ narrow reading that the property must be held directly by the plaintiff, noting that the statute’s phrase “regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder” expands, not limits, the scope of protected rights.

Outcome – The appellate court reversed the trial‑court’s demurrer as to the financial‑elder‑abuse cause of action, holding that Ring properly pleaded a claim in her individual capacity. The court vacated the demurrer, overruled it with respect to the elder‑abuse claim, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The remaining eight causes of action were left dismissed, and Ring was awarded costs on appeal.

Closing analysis – Ring v. Harmon furnishes a pivotal precedent for attorneys navigating the overlap of probate administration and elder‑abuse litigation. It confirms that a beneficiary‑representative may pursue a financial‑elder‑abuse claim personally when the alleged misconduct harms the elder’s individual property interest, even if that interest is intertwined with estate assets. The decision also underscores the limited reach of “special circumstances” jurisprudence; absent a conflict of interest, a personal representative must use the estate’s litigation vehicle for claims arising from estate transactions.

Practitioners should now assess elder‑abuse claims under the Welfare and Institutions Code with a broader view of “property rights,” recognizing that inchoate interests and rights subject to probate administration qualify. Moreover, the ruling cautions against conflating the representative’s fiduciary duties with the elder’s personal rights—two distinct avenues that may require separate pleadings. While the court left open the question of double‑recovery—whether damages under the elder‑abuse claim can overlap with those recoverable by the estate—future motions will likely address the interplay of statutory attorney‑fee awards (WIC § 15657.5) and Probate Code § 859’s double‑damages provision.

In sum, Ring v. Harmon expands the toolkit for protecting vulnerable elders in probate contexts, but it also places a premium on precise pleading strategy: attorneys must delineate clearly when a claim is estate‑centric versus personally directed, lest they risk dismissal on standing grounds. The decision will undoubtedly shape forthcoming litigation where probate processes are alleged to be weaponized for financial exploitation.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Probate Code §§ 9820, 9650, 9654, 9601, 9603, 7001
Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 15600‑15610.30, 15657.5 (Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act)
Business and Professions Code §§ 10240, 17200 (unfair competition)
Code of Civil Procedure § 369 (personal representative’s authority)

Major Cases Cited

Pineda v. Williams‑Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524
Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32
Zolly v. City of Oakland (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 73
Lyles v. Sangadeo‑Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759
Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381
Bohn v. Smith (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 678
Olson v. Toy (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 818
Tepper v. Wilkins (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1198
Wood v. Jamison (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 156
Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 134
Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468
Estate of Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971
Estate of Curry (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 502
Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115
Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168