Humphrey v. Bewley - Case Brief

Humphrey v. Bewley

Case Number: E074339

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-09-29

Case Brief – Humphrey v. Bewley

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: E074339
Disposition: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order quashing service of summons as to Peter D. Bewley, affirmed the order vacating the default as to all parties, and remanded for the trial court to give Bewley fifteen days (or a court‑determined alternative period) to respond to the first amended complaint; no costs were awarded.

Holding

The court held that an order granting a motion to quash service of summons is appealable, that service by publication must comply with CCP § 763.020 by describing the property with a legal description or, absent that, both a particular description and a street address, and that a defendant who makes a general appearance—such as by filing a motion to intervene—receives the benefit of personal jurisdiction despite defective service; consequently, the trial court erred in quashing service on Bewley but was correct in vacating the default and must allow Bewley a post‑service response period on remand.

Narrative

Quiet title, a procedural quagmire

When Douglas Humphrey filed a quiet‑title action in Riverside County in November 2012, he sought to strip a parcel in Rancho Mirage of clouded title that had passed through the hands of Joseph Janelunas (joint tenant) and his son Val Janelunas (sole owner after Joseph’s death). After Val’s death, the estate was administered by Peter D. Bewley. Humphrey’s complaint named the heirs of both Janelunas men and “all persons unknown” claiming any interest in the property. Because the defendants could not be located, the trial court ordered service by publication, and Humphrey obtained a default against all named parties in September 2014.

Three years later, Bewley—now administrator of Val’s estate—moved to intervene to expunge the lis pendens. Humphrey withdrew the lis pendens, and the court dismissed Bewley’s motion as moot. Bewley then sold the property and, after the estate’s final distribution, objected to Humphrey’s request for a default prove‑up hearing. At that hearing the trial court, sua sponte, quashed the service by publication and vacated the default, reasoning that the published notices identified the parcel only by assessor’s parcel number (APN) and omitted both a legal description and a street address.

Humphrey appealed, asserting that (1) service by publication was proper, (2) the court should not have set aside the default absent a motion from Bewley, and (3) the order to quash was not appealable. Bewley counter‑claimed that he was not a proper party, that the probate court held exclusive jurisdiction, and that Humphrey’s claim was barred.

Appealability clarified

The appellate court first addressed whether the trial court’s order was reviewable. Under CCP § 904.1(a)(3), an order granting a motion to quash service of summons is expressly appealable. The court rejected Bewley’s distinction between a “quash for lack of minimum contacts” and a “quash for defective service,” noting that the statutory language is unambiguous and that the 1951 amendment eliminated any historic ambiguity. Because the order to quash and the order vacating the default were interwoven, both are subject to appellate review.

Who may appeal?

Bewley argued that he was not a party below and therefore could not be bound by an appellate ruling. The court explained that an appellant must be “aggrieved,” but a respondent need only be an “adverse party” under CCP § 902 and the California Rules of Court. The complaint’s catch‑all designation—“all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable right … adverse to plaintiff’s title”—captured Bewley, who, as administrator, is the statutory successor of the decedent. Moreover, a notice of appeal was served on him, satisfying procedural requirements. Thus, Bewley is a proper party to the appeal.

Probate jurisdiction versus civil jurisdiction

Bewley’s contention that the probate court possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the parcel was dismissed as untimely and irrelevant to the appeal’s focus. While Probate Code §§ 850 and 11605 grant the probate court authority over estate assets, they do not preclude a third‑party civil action such as a quiet‑title suit. The appellate court emphasized that the trial court’s order did not adjudicate the merits of Humphrey’s claim; it merely addressed procedural defects, leaving the underlying jurisdictional question for later proceedings.

The crux of service by publication

California law requires that a notice published pursuant to CCP § 763.020 “particularly describe” the property and provide either a street address or a legal description. An APN alone is insufficient unless accompanied by a legal description; the statute expressly allows omission of the street address only when a legal description is present. The trial court’s order had authorized publication of the APN but had not required the legal description or street address. The actual notices contained only the APN, omitting both statutory elements. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed that service by publication was defective.

General appearance cures defective service

Bewley’s motion to intervene, filed after the default had been entered, constituted a general appearance under CCP § 410.50(a). A general appearance is equivalent to personal service and supplies the court with personal jurisdiction over the appearing party, even if the underlying service was improper. The court rejected Bewley’s reliance on CCP § 1014’s non‑exclusive list of acts that create a general appearance, citing Sunrise Financial, LLC v. Superior Court and related authority that a motion to intervene is a clear acknowledgment of the court’s authority. Consequently, while the trial court correctly vacated the default (the default was predicated on void service), it erred in quashing service as to Bewley, who had already obtained jurisdiction through his general appearance.

Timing of the default‑vacating order

Humphrey argued that the trial court should not have set aside the default sua sponte because Bewley failed to move within a reasonable time. The appellate court noted that a judgment void on its face—here, a default based on defective service—may be attacked at any time under Gassner v. Stasa and Falahati v. Kondo. The court’s action under CCP § 473(d) was therefore proper and not subject to laches.

Remand and forward path

The appellate court reversed the quash order only as to Bewley, affirmed the vacatur of the default, and remanded with instructions that the trial court serve Bewley notice of the order and grant him fifteen days (or a court‑determined alternative) to file a response to the first amended complaint. No costs were awarded.

Impact and unresolved questions

Humphrey v. Bewley reinforces two pivotal principles for California probate and real‑property litigators:

Strict compliance with CCP § 763.020—the inclusion of an APN alone does not satisfy the statutory description requirement. Practitioners must ensure that any published notice either contains a full legal description or, at minimum, a street address alongside a particular description.
General appearance doctrine—a defendant’s filing of a motion to intervene (or any act that does not challenge jurisdiction) bestows personal jurisdiction, even when service is later found defective. This can preserve a party’s rights against a default judgment predicated on improper service.

The decision also clarifies that orders quashing service are appealable, eliminating any lingering uncertainty about the scope of CCP § 904.1. However, the court left open the broader question of whether a probate court’s final distribution order can bind a third‑party claimant who later asserts an adverse claim in a separate civil action—a point that may surface in future disputes over estate‑derived real property.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

Code of Civil Procedure §§ 904.1(a)(3), 763.020, 410.50, 473(d), 670(a), 418.10(b)
Probate Code §§ 850, 9002, 9100, 11605
CCP § 1014 (non‑exclusive list of acts constituting a general appearance)
Doctrine of General Appearance (see Sunrise Financial, LLC v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 114)
Appealability of Service‑Quash Orders (statutory construction per Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402)
Void Judgment Review (Gassner v. Stasa (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 346; Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823)
Default‑Vacatur Standards (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1434)
Concurrent Probate and Civil Jurisdiction (Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (2021) ¶ 15:562)