Conservatorship of Joanne R. - Case Brief

Conservatorship of Joanne R. - Case Brief

Conservatorship of Joanne R.

Case Number: B310906

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-12-17

Case Brief – Conservatorship of Joanne R.

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-04
Case Number: B310906
Disposition: The appellate court affirmed the trial‑court order granting reappointment of Richard Stusser as conservator and rejecting Joanne R.’s challenge to the jury‑trial waiver.

Holding

The court held that, under the totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test, the trial court’s colloquy sufficiently informed Joanne R. of the nature and consequences of a jury‑trial waiver, rendering the waiver knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; consequently, the trial‑court’s acceptance of the waiver and its subsequent grant of reappointment were not reversible error.

Narrative

Lead – In a decision that underscores the delicate balance between procedural safeguards and pandemic‑driven court backlogs, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a lower‑court order reappointing a conservator of a mentally ill woman despite her claim that the court had coerced her into waiving a statutory right to a jury trial. The ruling clarifies the standards for jury‑trial waivers in Lanterman‑Petris‑Short (LPS) conservatorships and signals the court’s willingness to tolerate scheduling delays so long as the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.

Procedural History – Joanne R., placed under a LPS conservatorship in 2018 after being found gravely disabled, faced a petition for reappointment of her conservator, Richard Stusser, in November 2020. At a February 4, 2021 videoconference hearing, the trial judge explained the two trial options—an immediate “court trial” before the judge or a jury trial that could not be scheduled until November 2021. After a brief exchange, Joanne elected the court trial, thereby waiving her right to a jury trial. She later appealed, arguing that the waiver advisement was deficient and that the nine‑month delay amounted to improper inducement.

Issues – The appeal presented two intertwined questions: (1) whether the trial court’s colloquy satisfied the statutory and constitutional requirements for a valid jury‑trial waiver under Welfare and Institutions Code § 5350 and Probate Code § 1828(a)(6); and (2) whether the court’s statement that a jury trial would be unavailable for nine months constituted an impermissible inducement violating due‑process rights.

Holding and Reasoning – The appellate panel applied the “totality‑of‑the‑circumstances” approach articulated in People v. Sivongxay (2021) and earlier criminal‑procedure precedent. The trial judge had explained that a jury consists of twelve community members, that the jury must reach a unanimous verdict, and that a judge‑trial would be decided by the judge alone. Although the judge did not inform Joanne that she could participate in jury selection through counsel, the court relied on Weaver and Sivongxay to conclude that omission alone does not invalidate a waiver when the essential elements of the right are conveyed.

Regarding inducement, the court distinguished Joanne’s case from People v. Collins (2001), where the trial judge offered a vague “benefit” for waiving a jury trial. Here, the judge merely disclosed the scheduling reality—court trial that day versus jury trial in November—and invited Joanne to consult counsel before deciding. No reward or pressure was offered; thus, the waiver was deemed voluntary.

The panel also noted the pandemic‑related “good cause” finding that justified the nine‑month delay, acknowledging the systemic strain but refusing to deem the delay itself a constitutional violation. While the court cautioned lower courts to avoid excessive postponements that could erode a conservatee’s liberty interests, it stopped short of overturning the trial‑court’s decision.

Conclusion and Impact – By affirming the trial court’s waiver colloquy, the Court of Appeal reinforces that LPS conservatorship proceedings may satisfy waiver requirements without a rigid script, provided the conservatee receives a clear explanation of the jury’s composition, unanimity requirement, and the alternative judge trial. The decision also signals that pandemic‑induced scheduling delays, though undesirable, do not automatically render a waiver involuntary. Practitioners should ensure comprehensive, yet pragmatic, advisements and be prepared to document “good cause” for continuances. Unresolved, however, is the broader constitutional question of whether statutory 10‑day trial‑initiation deadlines can be routinely extended without infringing due‑process rights—a point likely to surface in future post‑pandemic litigation.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare and Institutions Code § 5000 et seq. (LPS Act)
  • WIC § 5350 (conservatorship appointment, right to jury trial, trial‑initiation timeline)
  • WIC § 5350(d)(2) (requirement that trial commence within 10 days of demand)
  • Probate Code § 1828(a)(6) (incorporated jury‑trial waiver provision)
  • People v. Sivongxay, 3 Cal.5th 151 (knowing, intelligent waiver standard)
  • People v. Weaver, 53 Cal.4th 1056 (waiver validity despite omitted advisement)
  • People v. Collins, 26 Cal.4th 297 (improper inducement analysis)
  • Conservatorship of Jose B., 50 Cal.App.5th 963 (concern over trial delays)
  • Conservatorship of Ben C., 40 Cal.4th 529 (statutory right to jury trial in LPS cases)

Last updated September 05, 2025.