People v. Washington - Case Brief

People v. Washington - Case Brief

People v. Washington

Case Number: B299238

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2021-12-03

Case Brief – People v. Washington

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025-09-03
Case Number: B299238
Disposition: Conditionally affirmed; remanded for the trial court to allow the defendant to assert his equal‑protection claim and, if warranted, to require a jury‑trial waiver.

Holding

The court held that the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) does not require the trial court to advise an alleged sexually violent predator of his statutory right to a jury trial, nor to obtain a knowing and intelligent personal waiver of that right; consequently, the trial court’s bench trial was proper, but the appellate court remanded so that the defendant may raise his equal‑protection challenge on the record.

Narrative

A bench trial without a jury—no procedural misstep?
When the People petitioned to commit Clayborn Washington as a sexually violent predator (SVP) in 2014, the trial court ultimately held the petition true and ordered his indeterminate confinement at the California Department of State Hospitals. Washington appealed, arguing that the court violated the SVPA by failing to inform him of his right to a jury trial and by accepting a blanket waiver of that right without a knowing, intelligent, personal waiver. He also asserted an equal‑protection claim, contending that the SVPA’s procedural scheme treats SVPs differently from other civil commitment categories (mentally disordered offenders—MDOs, not‑guilty‑by‑reason‑of‑insanity—NGI, and conservatorship under the LPS Act).

Procedural odyssey.
Washington’s criminal convictions for five sexually violent offenses dated to 1984. After his release, the People filed the SVPA petition on May 14, 2014, attaching conflicting psychological evaluations. Washington repeatedly appeared by video conference, at times refusing to attend, and ultimately waived his presence at the trial. The trial court set the matter for a bench trial on April 24, 2019 after both counsel agreed that no jury was demanded. No advisory statement about the right to a jury trial was made, and the court entered a minute order noting “No Demand for Jury Trial by the Respondent. Case will proceed as a Court Trial, non‑appearance.” Washington was convicted of the petition and committed; he timely appealed.

Statutory construction versus constitutional due process.
The core issue was whether § 6603 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (SVPA) implicitly imposes the same advisory and waiver requirements that the Penal Code §§ 2972 (MDO) and 1026.5 (NGI) impose. Those statutes expressly command the court to “advise the person of the right to a jury trial” and to obtain a personal waiver unless the person lacks capacity. The Supreme Court, in Blackburn and Tran, read those mandates as mandatory procedural safeguards.

The appellate court, applying de novo statutory construction, noted that the SVPA’s language is materially different. § 6603(a) grants a right to a jury trial; § 6603(f) makes a bench trial the default “unless the person or the petitioning attorney demands a jury trial.” The statute is silent on any advisory requirement or personal waiver. The court concluded that the Legislature deliberately omitted such language, creating a distinct procedural regime for SVP commitments. Legislative history reinforced this view: when the SVPA was enacted in 1995, the jury‑trial advisement provisions already existed in the MDO, NGI, and LPS statutes, yet the drafters left them out of the SVPA, signaling an intent to treat SVP proceedings differently.

Due‑process analysis.
Washington’s due‑process claim hinged on the four‑factor Otto test. The court found that while Washington’s liberty interest is profound, the procedural safeguard of a jury‑trial advisement adds only a minimal burden and does not substantially reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation. Moreover, Washington was present—albeit by telephone—when the bench‑trial designation was announced, and his counsel had apparently advised him of the procedural posture. The court therefore held that the lack of an advisory statement and personal waiver did not constitute a due‑process violation.

Equal‑protection claim left for the trial court.
Washington’s alternative argument was that the SVPA’s default bench trial, without an advisory requirement, creates an unjustified classification between SVPs and other civil committees (MDOs, NGIs). The appellate court recognized that the equal‑protection issue is a pure question of law that requires factual development—specifically, a showing by the People that the differential treatment is justified by the greater danger SVPs pose. Because Washington never raised the claim at the trial level, the appellate record is insufficient to decide the issue. The court declined to deem the claim forfeited, noting that forfeiture is not automatic and that the People had not been given an opportunity to justify the distinction. Accordingly, the case was remanded for the trial court to allow Washington to assert his equal‑protection challenge and, if the People cannot meet their burden, to vacate the SVP finding and order a jury trial unless Washington provides a knowing, intelligent waiver after personal advisement.

Implications for practitioners.
People v. Washington clarifies that the SVPA stands apart from other civil‑commitment statutes: no statutory duty exists to advise the alleged SVP of his jury‑trial right, nor to secure a personal waiver. Defense counsel in SVP proceedings need not obtain a formal waiver, but must remain vigilant that the client’s desire for a jury trial is expressly communicated, as the default is a bench trial. Conversely, prosecutors must be prepared, on remand, to articulate a robust justification—grounded in public‑safety considerations—for any procedural disparity if an equal‑protection challenge is raised. The decision also underscores the importance of raising constitutional claims at the trial level; while forfeiture may be avoided, failure to develop a factual record can delay resolution and increase litigation costs.

Unresolved questions.
The remand will test whether the People can satisfy the heightened scrutiny required for differential treatment of SVPs versus other civil committees. Should the People succeed, the bench‑trial default will be upheld; if not, the appellate court’s directive could compel a jury trial or, at a minimum, a personal waiver after advisement—effectively aligning SVPA procedures with those of MDO and NGI statutes. The case also leaves open whether future legislative amendments might harmonize the SVPA’s procedural safeguards with its counterparts, a development attorneys should monitor.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 6600‑6604 (Sexually Violent Predator Act)
  • Penal Code §§ 2972 (Mentally Disordered Offender commitment)
  • Penal Code §§ 1026.5 (Not‑Guilty‑by‑Reason‑of‑Insanity commitment)
  • Probate Code §§ 1827‑1828 (Conservatorship – LPS Act)
  • California Constitution, Art. I, § 7 (Equal protection)
  • U.S. Constitution, 14th Amend. (Equal protection)
  • People v. Rowell, 133 Cal.App.4th 447 (SVPA procedural interpretation)
  • People v. Blackburn, 61 Cal.4th 1113 (MDO advisory and waiver requirement)
  • People v. Tran, 61 Cal.4th 1160 (NGI advisory and waiver requirement)
  • State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.4th 339 (SVPA definition)
  • People v. Otto, 26 Cal.4th 200 (Due‑process four‑factor test)
  • People v. Moore, 50 Cal.4th 802 (Due‑process in SVPA)
  • People v. Allen, 44 Cal.4th 843 (Due‑process limits in SVPA)
  • People v. McKee, 47 Cal.4th 1202 (Equal‑protection analysis for civil committees)
  • People v. Garcia, 39 Cal.4th 1070 (Legislative awareness of prior construction)
  • In re Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th 875 (Forfeiture of pure‑law claims)
  • People v. Alexander, 49 Cal.4th 846 (Forfeiture of equal‑protection claims)

Last updated September 05, 2025.