Estate of Eskra - Case Brief

Estate of Eskra - Case Brief

Estate of Eskra

Case Number: A162671

Court: Cal. Ct. App.

Date Filed: 2022-05-03

Case Brief – Estate of Eskra

Court: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Date: 2025‑09‑02
Case Number: A162671
Disposition: Appeal affirmed; the trial court’s denial of rescission of the premarital agreement and its appointment of the deceased’s parents as co‑administrators was upheld.

Holding

The court held that Brandy L. Eskra’s unilateral mistake as to whether the premarital agreement had been amended to remove death‑related waivers was a mistake of fact for which she bore the risk; consequently, under Civil Code §§ 1577, 1578 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153, rescission was unavailable. The trial court’s failure to make additional findings on voluntariness under Family Code § 1615(c) was not prejudicial, and the appointment of the respondents as co‑administrators stood.

Narrative

Lead

In a tightly contested probate dispute, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s refusal to rescind a premarital agreement that stripped a surviving spouse of any claim to the decedent’s separate property. The decision underscores California’s strict approach to unilateral mistake in the context of premarital agreements and clarifies the allocation of risk when a party fails to read or verify the final terms of a contract.

Procedural History

Brandy L. Eskra filed a petition in Humboldt County Superior Court to be appointed personal representative of her late husband Scott Eskra’s estate. The trial court denied the petition, relying on a premarital agreement (the “Agreement”) that expressly waived Brandy’s rights to Scott’s separate property upon his death. Instead, the court appointed Scott’s parents, Steve Eskra and Catherine Grace, as co‑administrators.

Brandy appealed. The Court of Appeal (Eskra I, 2020) held that the trial court erred by excluding extrinsic evidence that could show the parties mistakenly believed the Agreement applied only in the event of divorce. The case was remanded for a trial on the mistake issue, but the appellate court declined to address the voluntariness inquiry under Family Code § 1615.

After a two‑day trial on remand, the trial court concluded that Brandy’s mistake was unilateral, that she bore the risk of that mistake, and that rescission was therefore unavailable. Brandy appealed again. The present opinion resolves that appeal.

Facts

  • Premarital Agreement Execution. On May 1 2015, the day before their wedding, Brandy and Scott signed an 11‑page premarital agreement in the office of Scott’s attorney, Laurence Ross. The agreement contained broad waivers of “all right, claim, or interest” each party might acquire in the other’s separate property, including community‑property rights, family‑allowance rights, probate‑homestead rights, and the right to be appointed personal representative. Paragraph 5.01 listed eight specific rights as examples, preceded by “including, but not limited to.”

  • Counsel Interaction. Brandy retained attorney Tracy Rain, who met with her on April 24 2015, explained the draft, and was told to “redact any language making the Agreement applicable in the event of death.” Rain sent an email to Ross that same day requesting removal of the death‑related subsections. Ross replied that the requested deletions were “inconsequential” because the opening language was broad, and he would not pursue a “major rewrite.” The revised agreement, which deleted only four of the eight listed death‑related items, was never shown to Brandy before signing.

  • Signing and Knowledge. On May 1 2015, Brandy and Scott signed the revised agreement in Ross’s office after a brief five‑minute encounter. Brandy testified she had not read the final document, relying on Scott’s alleged instruction to Ross to delete the death clauses and on Rain’s promise to review the revised version later. She later discovered that the death‑related waivers remained.

  • Estate Litigation. Scott died intestate in March 2018. Brandy sought appointment as personal representative; Scott’s parents filed a competing petition. The trial court, after excluding extrinsic evidence, denied Brandy’s petition and appointed the parents. On remand, the trial court allowed evidence of Brandy’s alleged unilateral mistake but limited the inquiry to mistake, not voluntariness.

Issues

  1. Whether Brandy’s mistake as to the Agreement’s applicability upon death constitutes a unilateral mistake of fact that warrants rescission.
  2. Whether Brandy bore the risk of that mistake under Civil Code §§ 1577, 1578 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153.
  3. Whether the trial court’s failure to make the statutory findings on voluntariness required by Family Code § 1615(c) was prejudicial.

Holding and Reasoning

1. Nature of the Mistake

The Court affirmed the trial court’s classification of Brandy’s error as a mistake of fact rather than a mistake of law. Brandy’s contention was that she believed the Agreement had been amended to eliminate all death‑related waivers—a factual belief about the document’s contents. The Court noted that a mistake of law involves a misapprehension of the legal consequences of known facts, which was not at issue here. Accordingly, the analysis proceeded under Civil Code §§ 1577 (mistake of fact) and § 1578 (mistake of law).

2. Allocation of Risk

The Court applied the framework articulated in Donovan v. RRL Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 261 (2001), which adopts Restatement § 153. To rescind on the basis of unilateral mistake of fact, a party must show:

  1. A basic assumption was mistaken;
  2. The mistake materially affected the exchange;
  3. The party did not bear the risk of the mistake; and
  4. Enforcement would be unconscionable.

The appellate court found Brandy failed on the third prong. Her failure to read the Agreement, despite having the revised draft in her possession and the opportunity to meet with her counsel on May 1, constituted neglect of a legal duty under Civil Code § 1577. The Court relied heavily on Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97 (1963), which held that a party’s failure to read a release is attributable to his own neglect and bars rescission. The Court also cited Stewart v. Preston Pipeline, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1565 (2005), and Lawrence v. Shutt, 269 Cal. App. 2d 749 (1979), for the proposition that ordinary negligence in failing to read a contract does not excuse a party from its terms.

Brandy’s reliance on the attorney’s promise to “redact” death clauses did not shift the risk. The Court emphasized that Ross’s email indicated the deletions were “inconsequential” and that the agreement’s broad opening language still covered death‑related waivers. Thus, Brandy’s belief was not grounded in a factual basis that the other party knowingly fostered; rather, it was a self‑inflicted error.

3. Unconscionability

Even assuming the risk prong were satisfied, the Court found no evidence that enforcing the Agreement would be unconscionable. The parties were represented by independent counsel, the agreement contained an integration clause, and there was no showing of fraud, overreaching, or undue influence. The Court noted that premarital agreements are presumed enforceable under the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, and the statutory presumption of voluntariness under Family Code § 1615(c) was not disturbed by the trial court’s omission of the five statutory findings because the appellate court had already determined the mistake claim insufficient.

4. Voluntariness Findings

The Court addressed Brandy’s argument that the trial court’s failure to make the statutory findings on voluntariness was prejudicial. Citing Bonds v. In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1 (2000), the Court reiterated that a premarital agreement is presumed voluntary unless the court makes the five findings required by § 1615(c). The appellate court concluded that because the mistake analysis alone was dispositive, the lack of explicit voluntariness findings did not affect the outcome and therefore was not a reversible error.

Conclusion

The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Brandy’s petition and its appointment of the respondents as co‑administrators. The decision reinforces California’s policy that parties who sign a written contract are bound by its terms unless they can demonstrate either (a) a mutual mistake, (b) that the other party encouraged or caused the mistake, or (c) that enforcement would be unconscionable. A party’s own negligence—including failure to read the contract or to follow up with counsel—places the risk of mistake on that party, precluding rescission.

Impact and Unresolved Questions

The opinion clarifies that premarital agreements are treated like commercial contracts for mistake analysis, limiting the ability of a spouse to escape waivers on the basis of a self‑inflicted misunderstanding. Practitioners should counsel clients to:

  • Review the final, signed document before execution, even when counsel assures that revisions have been made.
  • Obtain written confirmation of any substantive deletions, especially when the agreement contains broad “including but not limited to” language.
  • Document any discrepancies between draft and final versions contemporaneously.

The decision leaves open the question of how courts will treat mistakes of law in premarital agreements, particularly where a party misinterprets the legal effect of a clause that appears clear on its face. While Donovan permits rescission for unilateral mistake of fact where enforcement is unconscionable, the Court did not address whether a mistake of law—for example, a misunderstanding that a “family allowance” provision is not enforceable under Probate Code § 21610—might be rescued by equitable doctrines. Future litigation may explore the boundary between factual and legal mistakes in the family‑law context.

Referenced Statutes and Doctrines

  • Civil Code §§ 1577, 1578 – Definitions of mistake of fact and mistake of law; allocation of risk.
  • Family Code § 1615(c) – Presumption of involuntary execution of premarital agreements and the five statutory findings required to rebut it.
  • Probate Code § 21610 – Right of a surviving spouse to a statutory share of an intestate estate (referred to in the Agreement’s waiver language).
  • Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 153, 154, 157 – Governing rescission for unilateral mistake of fact and the concept of “neglect of a legal duty.”

Major Cases Cited

  • Donovan v. RRL Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 261 (2001) – Governs rescission on unilateral mistake of fact; risk allocation analysis.
  • Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97 (1963) – Failure to read a release constitutes neglect of a legal duty, precluding rescission.
  • Stewart v. Preston Pipeline, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 1565 (2005) – Applies Donovan and Casey to unilateral mistake claims.
  • Lawrence v. Shutt, 269 Cal. App. 2d 749 (1979) – Emphasizes the need for reasonable care in signing contracts.
  • Bonds v. In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1 (2000) – Discusses statutory presumption of involuntary execution of premarital agreements.
  • In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer, 202 Cal. App. 4th 1046 (2011) – Applies § 1615(c) findings to premarital agreements.
  • Haworth v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th 372 (2010) – Standard of review for factual findings in contract‑mistake cases.

Last updated September 05, 2025.